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1. INTRODUCTION 
This report is contributing to an ETEPS project aimed at analysing private sector R&D 
activities in the new EU member states.1 As a first major task, data availability and reliability 
have been assessed in Hungary. Then four sectors have been identified for more detailed 
analyses: two ones with the highest R&D intensities – excluding ICT sectors –, and further 
two ones with the fastest growing R&D intensities. 
 
 
Data sources 
The main data sources for this type of work are the R&D and innovation statistics collected 
by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office. It is a government agency with the mission to 
provide the society with reliable, impartial and relevant official statistics reflecting the 
economic, demographic, social and environmental situation of the society and changes 
occurring therein. 
Three main publications are relevant in the context of statistics related to research and 
development: 
• Kutatás és fejlesztés/ Research and Development (annual bilingual publication) 
The CSO has been collecting R&D data since 1969. During this 40 year period, the data 
collection and publication methods changed according to the specifications of the relevant 
guidelines, i.e. the Recommendations Concerning the International Standardisation of 
Science and Technology by the UNESCO from 1978, the Frascati Manual by the OECD 
from 1996, and its most recent EUROSTAT compatible version from 2002. 
• Innováció 1999-2001/ Innovation 1999-2001 
This specific publication is based on a 2002 survey, which was CIS3 compatible, run on 
6,100 companies, covering all sectors of the economy, except for mining and quarrying. 
The survey considered innovation activities conducted in 1999-2001. 
As a preparation for this activity, a pilot innovation survey was conducted in 2000. That 
pilot exercise included 1,700 companies from the manufacturing industry. 
• Innováció 2003/ Innovation 2003 
This specific publication is based on a CIS Light survey, conducted in 2004, covering all 
sectors – except for the construction industries and retail trade, hotels and restaurants, and 
other community, social and personal service activities –, involving 5,094 companies 
employing more than 10 employees. 
The Hungarian CIS4 survey results are being processed at the time of writing this report, 
due to be published in September 2006. 
A more detailed description of these data sources is available in Appendix 1, while their 
reliability assessment is presented in Appendix 2. 
Due to the crucial intra-sectoral differences among various segments of NACE 2-digit 
sectors, we have opted for sub-sectors (at NACE 3-digit level) as a unit of analysis. Thus, we 
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have also relied on Eurostat data for this country report, when CSO data have not been 
available at a NACE 3-digit level, e.g. on R&D employment. 
Selection of sectors 
When selecting the sectors for more detailed analyses, we had to face some data constraints: 
sectoral GDP (value added) data are not available for 2004 as of yet, and thus the 2001-2003 
period had to be used here to calculate increase in R&D intensity. (2004 R&D data are 
already available.) The two sectors with the highest R&D intensities – excluding ICT ones – 
are Manufacture of pharmaceuticals and Manufacture of other electric equipment;2 and two 
sectors with the highest increase in R&D intensity in recent years are Manufacture of parts 
and accessories for motor vehicles and their engines and Manufacture of medical 
instruments.3 As Table 1.1 indicates, one sector satisfies both of the two main selection 
criteria in the same time: Manufacture of other electric equipment has shown a fast growth in 
terms of its R&D intensity, and thus, it has achieved a relatively high R&D intensity – when 
compared to other Hungarian sectors, i.e. not in absolute terms or in an international 
comparison – by 2003. 
 
Table 1.1: Selection of sectors for the sectoral studies 
 Sector name NACE  
code 
R&D intensity: 
private R&D 
investment as 
percentage of 
sectoral GDP (2003) 
Increase in  
R&D intensity (%) 
Sectoral GDP 
as  
percentage of 
national GDP 
(2003) 
1 Manufacture of pharmaceuticals  244 19.27% -4,7% 2001-2003 0,51% 
2 
Manufacture of 
other electric 
equipment 
316 3.48% 54.05% 2001-2003 0,26% 
3 
Manufacture of 
parts and 
accessories for 
motor vehicles 
and their engines 
343 2.88% 114.21% 2001-2003 0,81% 
4 
Manufacture of 
medical 
instruments 
331 2.7% 34.08% 2001-2003 0,11% 
Source: calculation based on CSO data 
 
Section 2 of this country report provides a brief background for the sectoral analyses by 
summarising the major STI policy challenges at a national level, introducing the current 
policy tools, and reviewing the most important RTDI indicators. Then Sections 3-5 present 
the sectoral cases studies: two sectors are closely linked to automotive industry, and thus 
those two reports are combined into a single section. Section 6 summarises the main findings, 
and offers conclusions. 
                                                 
2
 We have dropped one of the selection criteria, namely a minimum threshold of 2% for the sectors’ 
contributions to GDP as we have opted for sub-sectors at a NACE 3-digit level. 
3
 For the same reason, when selecting these two sectors, we have disregarded the minimum threshold of 1 % of 
GDP. 
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2. NATIONAL LEVEL STI-POLICY  
 
2.1. NATIONAL STI POLICY 
 
The principal challenge for Hungary is to achieve cohesion with the advanced member states 
of the EU to improve quality of life. The most recent internationally comparable dataset 
(European Innovation Scoreboard 2005) backs this conclusion by suggesting that there is a 
gap between Hungary’s GDP per capita performance and its innovation performance. Thus, 
international competitiveness should be enhanced significantly and then maintained for long-
term, i.e. it should not – and cannot – merely be based on low production costs. Hungary is 
already squeezed in a ‘nut cracker’ formed by advanced countries, on the one hand, and 
dynamic industrialising countries, on the other. The former are capable of controlling 
international production networks and markets via new technologies, financial muscles and 
superior business models, while the latter are characterised by extremely low wages and 
highly disciplined work forces. It is crucial for Hungary to escape from this trap. That 
requires the introduction of new products, production processes and services, as well as 
modern managerial techniques and other types of organisational innovations to raise 
productivity and find new markets. Macro-economic pressures, notably budget, trade, and 
balance of payment deficits, also call for a successful, competitive economy. Brain drain, 
which is harmful both from an economic and a social point of view, can only be reversed, or 
at least slowed down, by offering attractive conditions for researchers and engineers; i.e. 
challenging projects, appropriate funds, much better equipment and higher income. 
Innovation is a must to tackle these issues, but definitely not a panacea: a coherent cohesion 
strategy is required, composed of appropriate human resource development, health, 
macroeconomic, investment promotion, regional development and environmental policies – 
just to mention the cornerstones – aligned with each other, as well as with the overall, broad 
aim of socially, economically and environmentally sustainable and rapid development. 
 
There is already a very high share of foreign-owned companies in Hungary, but they should 
be better embedded in the domestic economy by improving the performance of the local 
supplier base, creating attractive conditions for more intense academia-industry relationships, 
including both local and foreign firms, and thus convincing foreign firms to invest in 
knowledge-intensive activities in Hungary and offer well-paid jobs by doing so. In sum, a 
number of elements of the national innovation system (NIS) should be strengthened, and even 
more importantly, the relationships between them should be intensified. (Hungarian CIS3 
data clearly show that the linkages between the innovative companies and other players of 
NIS are significantly less frequent than those in the EU15 countries.) In brief, a more 
efficient innovation system could further stimulate future growth. 
 
Regional innovation (and innovation governance) systems are also underdeveloped in 
Hungary, and a number of modern policy preparation tools (decision-making methods) have 
been missing both at national and regional levels, or, at best, used only sporadically. The 
most pertinent examples are regular collection and analysis of RTDI data, foresight 
programmes, and systematic evaluation of policy tools. 
 
The overall objective of most of the current RTDI policy measures is to improve 
competitiveness in various ways, i.e. they address the principal challenge faced by Hungary. 
Table 2.1 provides a comprehensive overview of those RTDI policy measures, which are 
currently in place, and might have direct or indirect relevance on business RTDI activities. 
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Table 2.1: Overview of RTDI policy measures 
Title of measure Start date End date Budget Number* 
Technological innovation in supplier networks (INTEG2006) 2006 np 6.9 m € HU 107 
"Kozma Laszlo" Prog, to facilitate knowledge transfer 2006 np 3 m € HU 106 
"Baross Gabor" Prog, Supporting regional innov networks 2006 np 18.6 m € HU 105 
IPR protection for SMEs abroad 2006 np 225,564 € HU 103 
Establishing a model incubator centre for biotechnology 2005 2007 3,8 m € HU 100 
"Irinyi Janos" Programme, realisation of individual inventors' 
R&D results and innovative ideas (5LET 2005) 
2006 2008 5,3 m € HU 99 
Setting up a Nanotechnology Research Laboratory 2006 2009 7.2 m € HU 98 
"Asboth Oszkar" Prog for Cutting-edge Industries, 2005 2005 2009 26 m € HU 97 
INNOCSEKK (Innovation voucher) 2005 2007 20 m € HU 96 
Law on Research and Technological Innovation 2005 np na HU 95 
Large international R&D projects 2005 2007 9.6 m € HU 94 
Regional Innovation Agencies 2005 2007 5.6 m € HU 93 
Mobile Communications R&D and Innovation Centre 2005 2008 8 m € HU 92 
Co-operative Research Centres (KKK II) 2005 np 8 m € HU 91 
Information infrastructure for R&D 2005 np 5.6 m € HU 90 
Innovative Education Support Systems 2005 np 1.6 m € HU 89 
Miksa Deri (EUREKA) 2005 2010 2 m € HU 88 
"Pazmany Peter" Prog (Regional Knowledge Centres at 
Universities) 
2005 2008 36 m € HU 87 
Research and Technological Innovation Fund 2004 np na HU 86 
Employment of PhD, MSc or MBA students 2004 np  HU 85 
200% of R&D expenditures deductible 2001 np  HU 84 
Developing the infrastructure of education and training 2004 2006 98.8 m € HU 83 
Promoting life-long learning and adaptability 2004 2006  HU 82 
Agri-food RTDI projects 2004 np 12 m € HU 74 
Innovation and research activities of SMEs 2004 2006 1.6 m € HU 73 
Development of corporate research infrastructure related to 
the creation of new RTD jobs 
2004 2006 3.2 m HU 69 
Support to new, technology and knowledge-intensive micro-
enterprises and spin-off companies (GVOP 3.3.1) 
2004 2006 3.2 m € HU 58 
S&T co-operation of businesses and publicly financed research 
units (CRC, GVOP 3.2.2) 
2004 2006 12 m € HU 55 
Development of the research infrastructure of publicly financed 
and non-profit research facilities 
2004 2006 12 m € HU 51 
"Jedlik Anyos" Programme 2000 np 44 m € HU 24 
Participation of SMEs in EU 6th Framework Programme 2003 2007  HU 22 
Social conditions of technological development 1991 np  HU 13 
Regional information and consultancy services on EU 6th 
Framework Programme 
2003 2007  HU 6 
Application-oriented co-operative RTD activity 2004 2006 28 m € HU 1 
Source: European TrendChart on Innovation database; * number of a given policy measure in that database 
Notes: np = no end date planned; na = Not applicable 
 
Two of the above measures are of direct relevance for the sectors analysed in this report. 
Both of them are recent ones, however, and thus it would be too early to assess their impacts 
on business R&D activities. 
 
One of them, called Technological innovation in supplier networks (INTEG2006) aims to 
enhance the innovation capabilities of SMEs in order to prepare them to establish long-term 
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supplier relationships with medium-sized or large enterprises (the so-called integrators). The 
main tool to promote these strategic partnerships is co-operation in innovation projects in 
four sectors: machinery, automotive, electronics, and precision engineering industries. 
 
The overall aims of the measure are to: 
• increase the share of indigenous suppliers in the supplier networks of medium-sized and 
large enterprises; 
• decrease the dependence of indigenous suppliers; 
• provide motivation for the “integrator” companies to increase the number of indigenous 
suppliers; 
• improve co-operation between integrators and suppliers in the field of technological 
innovation; 
• promote the growth of SMEs. 
 
The specified industries are among the best performing sectors of the Hungarian economy 
with respect to production and exports. Typically, they are also characterised by dominant 
foreign ownership and the use of multinational supplier networks. The measure aims to 
facilitate higher Hungarian participation in these industries and increase the potential for 
learning and upgrading for indigenous SMEs. In the first phase of the projects, the medium-
sized and large size companies must select SMEs that wish to become their suppliers, identify 
the aims of the project, and co-operate in product and process innovation tasks. The partners 
should develop a medium-term business plan, explaining how the project's results would be 
exploited by the suppliers and the integrator. The integrators should monitor the progress of 
innovation activities of the selected partners, who should co-operate with each other. The 
integrators must also provide a statement that upon the completion of the project, they shall 
audit the participating SMEs, and in case of a successful audit, issue a supplier certificate. 
 
The other one is called Establishing a model incubator centre for biotechnology 
(BIOINKUB). This measure provides support for investments, which aim to create incubator 
centres for small- or medium-sized enterprises in the field of biotechnology. The centres shall 
be able to operate independently; they must offer favourable conditions for the R&D 
activities of the hosted enterprises aimed at developing new products, processes and services, 
and promote their growth. The project consists of two phases. In the first phase, the applicant 
develops the specified infrastructure using the funds provided by the measure and finishes the 
investment project within two years. In the second phase, the applicant is obliged to operate 
the incubator centre according to the original terms defined in the call for five years. The 
centre must provide services that assist entrepreneurship and innovation activities in the 
hosted companies. 
 
Other measures, not aimed at supporting specific sectors or technologies, might be also 
relevant for pharmaceuticals, automotive or medical instruments companies, e.g. the ones 
offering tax incentives for R&D, as well as those promoting applied research and the 
introduction of new products or production processes; academia-industry co-operation; the 
improvement of innovation capabilities of SMEs; start-up and spin-off companies; 
modernisation and/ or extension of corporate R&D infrastructure; international RTDI co-
operation. 
 
There are no readily available studies to assess the impacts of these other – “generic” – 
measures on the four sub-sectors analysed in Sections 3-5. 
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2.2. R&D INDICATORS 
 
Hungary’s innovation performance is lagging considerably behind the EU25 average. On the 
input side, the most worrisome feature is the very low spending of businesses on R&D: 
0.33% of GDP (in 2004), which is less than one third of the EU25 average. Hungarian R&D 
expenditures are way below the Lisbon (Barcelona) targets, and public R&D expenditures 
have been shrinking. (Table 2.2; Figure 2.1) Given the macroeconomic pressures to comply 
with the Maastricht criteria, a pre-requisite to join the euro zone, it is questionable that the 
country would make any significant progress in this respect in the coming years. 
 
Table 2.1: GERD/GDP (per cent) 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
GERD/GDP 0.82 0.94 1.01 0.95 0.89 0.95 
Source: Central Statistical Office 
 
Figure 2.1: Composition of GERD by funding sources (current bn HUF) 
105.4
140.6
171.5 175.8 181.5
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0
50
100
150
200
250
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Businesses Government Other domestic Foreign Total
 
Source: Central Statistical Office 
 
The number of R&D units operated by business enterprises has increased considerably by 
2005, but from a very low level, if one takes into account the number of enterprises (several 
hundreds of thousands). The growth of research scientists and engineers employed by 
enterprises has been modest until 2004, and then quite remarkable in 2005: 16.2%. (Table 
2.2) 
 
Table 2.2: Number of R&D units and R&D employment (FTE) by sector 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
R&D institutes and other research units 121 133 143 168 175 201 
   Scientists and engineers 4,653 4,657 4,622 4,741 4,693 4,959 
R&D units at higher education 
institutes 
1,421 1,574 1,613 1,628 1,697 1,566 
   Scientists and engineers 5,852 5,938 5,999 5,957 5,902 5,911 
R&D units of business enterprises 478 630 670 674 669 749 
   Scientists and engineers 3,901 4,071 4,344 4,482 4,309 5,008 
R&D units; total 2,020 2,337 2,426 2,470 2,541 2,516 
Scientists and engineers; total 14,406 14,666 14,965 15,180 14,904 15,878 
Source: Research and Development, Central Statistical Office, various years 
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The most recent available survey results suggest that only 28.8% of Hungarian manufacturing 
firms are innovative (the Hungarian CIS3 survey, covering the period of 1999-2001), 
compared to 47% in the EU industry (CIS3, 1998-2000) Neither important innovation input 
data, e.g. innovation expenditures, nor innovation output data, such as the share of new 
products in sales or export revenues, and effects of innovations, are published in Hungary. 
 
There is a significant gap in terms of human resources for R&D and innovation: the ratio of 
science and engineering graduates among people aged between 20 and 29 was 4.8‰, which 
leaves Hungary in 21st position in the EU25. Yet, the low share of S&E graduates might be 
regarded as a rational reaction if it is seen in its wider historical perspective. R&D personnel 
had been cut drastically up until 1995, by 56.5 percent compared to 1988.4 Since then, a slight 
increase can be observed. Yet, the 2005 total was still 48.4% lower than the 1988 one, while 
for scientists and engineers the gap is 25.9%.(Figure 3)  Moreover, the number of university 
personnel is still being cut, in spite of the ‘exploding’ number of students.5 Against this 
background, it is quite understandable that young talents opt for other career paths. 
 
Figure 3: R&D personnel in Hungary, 1988-2005, full-time equivalent 
45069
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19585 23534 2323921427 17550
10499 14406
15878
0
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20000
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40000
50000
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Source: Central Statistical Office 
 
Another important indicator on human resources for innovations, namely the share of 
working age population with tertiary education shows a considerably smaller gap: 16.7% 
(HU) vs. 21.9% (EU25) in 2004. A further warning is signalled, however, by the low 
participation in life-long learning: 4.6% (HU) of the population aged 24-65 years, as opposed 
to 9.9% (EU25) in 2004.6 
 
An apparently very good Hungarian performance is suggested by four indicators: employment 
in high-tech manufacturing and services was 125% and 98% of the EU25 average, 
respectively (in 2003), while the ratio of high-tech products in total exports was 122% of the 
EU25 average (2003), and the share of value added stemming from high-tech manufacturing 
stood at 126 percent of the EU25 average (in 2002). Yet, a number of factors should be 
considered when appraising these figures from a policy point of view. First, one should keep 
in mind the very high share of FDI in Hungarian manufacturing, coupled with the weight of 
foreign-owned firms active in sectors that are classified as high-tech ones by the OECD, given 
their R&D intensity. Second, although these sectors are regarded as “engines of growth”, a 
                                                 
4
 The first few years of the transition process, i.e. 1990-92, were especially harsh in this respect. 
5
 For an overview of planned redundancies at a number of universities and colleges, see, e.g. Népszabadság, 19 
February 2005. 
6
 It should be added, however, that there is no unequivocally accepted indicator that could provide us with 
meaningful and comparable measurement of this phenomenon. 
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number of recent theoretical and empirical analyses refute this widely held, uncritically 
accepted view. (Hirsch-Kreinsen et al. [2005]; Sandven et al. [2005]; Smith [2002], [2003]; 
von Tunzelmann and Acha [2004]) Third, R&D-intensive industries (or services), as classified 
by the OECD, are not necessarily R&D-intensive ones in all countries. In fact, R&D 
intensities of the so-called ICT high-tech industries were way below the OECD high-tech 
threshold in 1995-2000 in a large number of OECD member states, including all the four 
Central European member states, as well as Denmark, Italy, Korea, Mexico, Portugal and 
Spain. What is even more striking, the R&D intensity of the high-tech ICT sectors was below 
the average R&D intensity of manufacturing industry in the four Central European countries. 
(Srholec [2006]) Thus, it would be a gross mistake to regard these sectors as ‘technology 
leaders’ – with all the assumed positive impacts on growth and competitiveness – in these 
countries. 
 
Further RTDI indicators – national and sectoral ones – are reproduced in Appendices 3-13. 
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3. SECTOR STUDY: THE HUNGARIAN PHARMACEUTICALS 
SECTOR 
 
3.1.  PATTERNS, NATURE AND SOURCE OF R&D 
 
The chemical industry has been one of the best performing industries considering its overall 
performance and the specified research and development indicators since the transition of the 
Hungarian economy started. Although the whole chemical industry is characterised by 
dynamic development and high R&D potential, the sub-divisions of the industry show 
significant differences regarding the importance of R&D and the use and availability of R&D 
resources. This report, therefore, relies on sub-division (NACE 3) level data for the 
manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and botanical products wherever it is 
available. 
 
The difference between the performances of the pharmaceutical and the chemical industry is 
also apparent at the EU25 level, where the production volumes of these industries rose by 2.7 
and 2.5 percent, respectively in 2004, by 3.7 and 1.9 percent in 2005 and are expected to 
grow by 3.8 and 2.3 percent in 2006 (CEFIC, 2005). This means that in the past few years the 
pharmaceutical industry grew significantly faster than the complete chemical industry. 
Hungary’s contribution to the production of chemicals on the EU25 level is not substantial. In 
2002, the value added produced by the Hungarian chemical industry amounted to 1,191 m 
euro, which is less than 1 percent of the total EU25 production. The Hungarian chemical 
industry employed 35,000 employees, (1.8 percent of the EU25 employment) at 14,300 euro 
cost per head. In 2004, Hungary claimed 0.7 percent of the EU25 chemical industry, which 
amounted to 586bn euro. (Eurostat, 2005) 
 
The share of pharmaceuticals in the national GDP has grown to 0.5% by 2003, thanks to a 
healthy growth in its production value (from 840 m euro in 1999 to 1537 m euro in 2003). 
 
The private R&D expenditures in NACE 24.4 amounted to 82.6 m euro in 2004, up from 43.7 
m euro in 1998. The share of R&D expenditures of pharmaceuticals industry in the total 
BERD is close to 28%, that is, exceeds 34% of the private R&D expenditures in the 
manufacturing industry. 
 
The number of researchers has been fluctuating around 1600-1700 since 1998. The total 
number of researchers was 1771 (head counts) in 2004, which represents around 20% of the 
total number of researchers in the private sector. 
 
The manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemicals and botanical products proved to 
be the most R&D intensive industry in Hungary concerning the specified indicators. In 2003, 
the ratio of R&D expenditure to the GDP and sales revenue of the sector amounted to 19.27% 
and 11.38% respectively. This is by far the highest R&D intensity value with respect to both 
indicators among all the sectors of the Hungarian manufacturing industry. Between 2001 and 
2003, R&D expenditure in the pharmaceuticals industry increased by 20 percent/year on 
average and R&D intensity averaged around 11 and 20 percent in terms of the sales revenue 
and sectoral GDP. The second indicator shows a slight decrease in the R&D intensity of the 
sector since its value was even higher in 2001 than in 2003. The weight of the 3-digit sector 
in the national GDP is 0.507 percent, while it claims about 2.5 percent of the industrial 
output. 
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Table 3.1 presents those production indicators for which time series are available in the 
pharmaceuticals industry. The data suggests that the manufacture of pharmaceuticals is one 
of the biggest contributors to the production and employment in the Hungarian chemical 
industry. In 1998, the pharmaceuticals industry claimed more than 50 per cent of the value 
added and the gross operating surplus of the chemical industry. 
 
Table 3.1: Overview of the Hungarian pharmaceuticals and chemicals industry, 1998 
 Manufacture of 
pharmaceuticals, 
medicinal chemicals 
and botanical 
products 
Manufacture of 
chemicals and 
chemical products 
Number of persons employed (1000) 16.0 39.6 
Sales (m euro) 857.5 2264.8 
Value added (m euro) 394.8 792 
Gross operating surplus (m euro) 231.6 467.4 
Personnel costs (m euro) 163.2 324.6 
Labour productivity (1000 euro/head) 24.8 20 
Unit personnel costs (1000 euro/head) 10.3 8.2 
Social security costs/total personnel costs 26.6 27 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Data on the evolution of production and sales volumes is also available. 
 
Table 3.2: Evolution of the Hungarian pharmaceuticals industry, 2003-2005 
Percentage change* in volume of 2003 2004 2005 
Gross output 121.8 108.1 99.9 
Total sales 115.5 110.6 95.7 
     Domestic 95.0 97.3 98.5 
     Export 125.8 118 160.6 
* previous year = 100 % 
Source: author’s calculation based on CSO data 
 
Figure 3.1 shows the evolution of sales revenues of the Hungarian pharmaceuticals market 
between 1997 and 2004. While the number of boxes consumed remained fairly stable, the 
value of sales has continuously increased during the period. In 2004, sales of pharmaceuticals 
exceeded 480 bn HUF. 
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Figure 3.1: The Hungarian pharmaceuticals market, 1997-2004 
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Tables 3.3-3.4 present detailed, not readily available information on the evolution of the 
pharmaceuticals industry between 1997 and 2002.7 While the number of employees decreased 
by 30 percent, net sales revenues increased by 40 percent during this period. It seems that 
exports played a major role in the increase of net sales revenues, as export sales rose by 68 
percent. The increase in pre-tax profits and value added is even more spectacular, with 57 and 
61.5 percent respectively. The improvements in the profits/sales and value added/sales ratios 
also indicate that the growth rate of revenues and profits was higher than that of sales. These 
favourable changes together with a substantial decrease in the number of employees resulted 
in increasing R&D expenditure, sales and value added per capita terms. These indicators 
suggest that labour productivity increased substantially and the allocation of R&D funding 
became more efficient. 
 
Table 3.3: Overview of the Hungarian pharmaceuticals industry, 1997-2002 
  1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Number of employees (1000) 15.6 15.7 14.8 14.4 13.5 11.1 
Net sales revenue (bn HUF) 187 210.2 218.4 265 292.4 262.8 
Net export revenue (bn HUF) 103.8 117.7 120 157.6 184 174.2 
Pre-tax profits (bn HUF) 45.3 39.1 38.1 49.5 70.2 71.4 
Value added (bn HUF) 85.9 98.2 96.9 125.6 145.6 138.8 
Equity (bn HUF) 53.3 53.3 54.4 57.8 53.8 49.6 
Loans* (bn HUF) 0.18 0.14 1.54 0.87 6.35 1.09 
Foreign ownership (% of equity) 73.4 72.4 72.0 80.4 79.4 80.5 
State ownership (% of equity) 8.8 8.8 13.6 8.1 8.7 9.4 
* loans specifically for investment and development purposes 
Source: CSO and author’s calculation 
 
                                                 
7
 Calculations are based on data from companies on double entry book keeping and employing more than 10 
people. 
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Table 3.4: R&D intensity and efficiency of the Hungarian pharmaceuticals industry, 
2000-2002 
 
R&D 
expenditure/ 
employee* 
Sales/ 
employee* 
Value added/ 
employee* Profits/ sales 
Value added/ 
sales 
2000 n.a. 18.4 8.7 0.18 0.47 
2001 1.28 21.6 10.7 0.24 0.49 
2002 1.6 23.7 12.5 0.27 0.52 
*m HUF/head 
Source: CSO and author’s calculation  
 
Another interesting feature is that while in 1997 the companies received only 183 m HUF in 
loans for investment and development purposes, this amount increased dramatically by 2002.  
 
 
3.2. DETERMINANTS OF R&D 
 
Until 1985, production of the biggest Hungarian pharmaceutical companies was scheduled 
according to the regulations of the Pharmaceutical Trust, which required that the companies 
manufactured complementary pharmaceuticals, to avoid competition. During the transition of 
the Hungarian economy, a significant amount of foreign investment flew to the 
pharmaceuticals industry, either via privatisation of the formerly state-owned companies or 
greenfield investments. As Table 3.3 shows, around 72-80 percent of the industry is owned 
by foreign investors, while the Hungarian state hold a minor, 8 percent stake. 
 
Foreign direct investment became a major determinant of R&D at the Hungarian companies. 
R&D plays an increasingly important role in maintaining and improving the companies’ 
competitive positions. It is even more so in the case of pharmaceutical companies, whose 
long-term competitiveness depends on their ability to innovate and develop original 
molecules. Companies mainly specialising in the production of generics cannot maintain a 
competitive edge over producers from the Far East, and recently introduced EU 
environmental protection regulations also pose difficulties for their operations. However, the 
funding required for the development and marketing of a new, original pharmaceutical has 
increased drastically as ever more complex clinical testing regulations have been introduced 
during the past decades. While the development of an original pharmaceutical product cost 
around 149 m Euros in 1975, its costs increased to 868 m euro by 2000 (AIPM, 2006). 
Prevailing regulations and requirements in the pharmaceuticals industry, such as the 
documentation of patent applications, tests required for the registration of new drugs and the 
qualification of the production technologies significantly increase the costs associated with 
research hand development. For this reason large TNCs have become the dominant actors in 
the pharmaceuticals industry all over the world, and small and medium-sized companies lost 
momentum due to their limited R&D resources.  
 
Foreign investment facilitated higher R&D expenditure per researcher, and access to the most 
up to date technologies in Hungary, too. In contrast, the number of research personnel and 
projects decreased. Foreign direct investment, nonetheless, increased the competitiveness of 
the Hungarian pharmaceuticals companies, and accelerated the transformation of the 
industry’s innovation model. Although the overall positive effects of foreign direct 
investment (which, besides the inflow of physical capital also included the transfer of 
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technology, management skills and know-how) is unambiguous, it seems that in some cases it 
had an adverse impact on the R&D activities of the Hungarian manufacturers. In many cases, 
the foreign owners re-allocated the R&D capacities of the Hungarian affiliates in a way that 
serves cost-efficiency at the TNC level.  
 
Figure 3.2 presents the 10 best performing Hungarian pharmaceuticals companies in terms of 
sales (bars), and market share (percentage indicated above bars). 
 
Figure 3.2: The top 10 Hungarian pharmaceuticals firms, 1997-2004 
 
        Source: Richter Gedeon Rt.  
 
 
The oldest Hungarian pharmaceutical manufacturer is the Richter Gedeon Rt., which was 
established in 1901. As of today, Richter is the only independent pharmaceutical 
manufacturer, without strategic pharmaceutical investors. The Hungarian state still holds a 
25.3 percent share of the company’s stocks. Since 2001, Richter performs original research 
exclusively in the field of the central nervous system, and specialises in the development of 
painkillers, memory enhancing and neuro-protective formulas. Richter also holds a majority 
stake in the Polish pharmaceuticals manufacturer, GZF Polfa. The company aims to become a 
regional multinational company, and has already established manufacturing and logistics 
facilities in several CEE countries. 
 
The main indicators of the company’s performance are indicated in table 3.5. 
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Table 3.5: Overview of Richter Gedeon Rt., 1997-2005 
 1997 2002 2004 2005 
Net revenue*  52.5 99.3 120.6 140.9 
Export sales*  n.a. n.a. 85.9 100.1 
Operating surplus* n.a. n.a. 35 37.3 
Pre-tax profits* 17.8 20.6 37.4 43.6 
After tax profits* 16.6 28.1 37.1 43.6 
R&D expenditures* 1.8 7.8 12.16 10.4 
R&D intensity (% of 
sales revenues) 6.5 7.9 8.2 8.6 
Number of employees 4,450 5,124 7,260 8,078 
* in bn HUF 
Source: Richter Gedeon Rt. 
 
EGIS is another leading pharmaceutical manufacturer, which was established in 1913 and 
introduced its first original medicine in 1967. In 1991, strategic investors like the Japan 
Tobacco Inc injected capital into the company and the EBRD purchased 30 percent of the 
company’s stocks. In 1995, Servier bought a 50.9 percent majority stake in EGIS. A further 
42.9 percent of the company’s stocks is held by foreign institutions and private investors. 
 
Table 3.6: Overview of EGIS, 1997-2005 
 1997 2002 2004 2005 
Sales revenue* 31.8 55.2 66.1 72.9 
Domestic sales* n.a. n.a. 26.9 29.7 
Export (m USD) 16.6 34.4 18.7 22.2 
Operating surplus* n.a. 67 74.7 111.1 
Pre-tax profits* n.a. 64.5 83.5 128.2 
After tax profits* n.a. n.a. 73.9 113.8 
R&D expenditures* 2.3 3.78 4.85 5.33 
R&D intensity (% of 
sales revenues) 7.2 6.8 7.3 7.3 
Number of employees 2,714 2,708 2,733 2,716 
Number of R&D staff 468 419 n.a. n.a. 
*in bn HUF 
Source: EGIS Rt. 
 
The overall domestic sales of pharmaceuticals have been continuously increasing during the 
past few years. The same trend can be observed in most developed countries, where 
expenditures on pharmaceuticals increased by 5-10% per annum on average. This is partially 
due to the increasing price of pharmaceuticals, but more importantly to the volume and the 
composition effects. It seems that people tend to by more pharmaceuticals at a higher price, 
and the proportion of new, more expensive medicines has increased. In Hungary the 
composition effect is the major contributor to the increasing expenditure and the government 
encourages changes to the structure of consumption in favour of the more extensive 
application of generic medicines (GKI, 2006). In order to decrease the imbalance caused by 
the subsidised medicines, since 2003, Hungarian pharmaceuticals manufacturers pay 
contributions to the Social Security Fund according to their market share. Total contributions 
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to the Fund amounted to 9 bn HUF in 2004, 20 bn HUF in 2005 and projected to reach 22.5 
bn in 2006.  
 
Since Hungary has joined the EU, significant changes have been introduced to the regulation 
of the pharmaceuticals industry in order to ensure the harmonisation of the legal framework. 
The most important policy document that had to be implemented was the Directive on 
Transparency that helped the transition of the Hungarian system. As a result of pressure from 
the industry’s associations, a revised version of this policy has been issued, which is 
acceptable to all parties. Based on this experience, the Implementation strategy of the Future 
Medicine Legislation is being developed together with chambers and industrial associations. 
 
 
3.3. IMPACT OF R&D 
 
Studies and sectoral analyses that systematically analyse the relationship between R&D and 
company performance in the pharmaceuticals industry are not available, except for the work 
of Reiter (2005). Occasionally press releases and studies that examine the state of R&D in 
Hungary shed some light on certain aspects of the issue. Further information is on the 
industry level is available from the time series data presented in Section 1, and from the 
associations of the Innovative Pharmaceutical Manufacturers and the Hungarian 
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers. Company level information is available for the companies 
listed on the stock exchange, i.e. Egis, Richter, Phylaxia-Pharma and HUMET. 
 
Since most Hungarian pharmaceutical manufacturers are part of the production networks of 
professional foreign investors, the evolution of R&D activities can only be discussed in the 
context of the transnational R&D strategy of the foreign owners. The effects of foreign 
ownership on the evolution of research at the Hungarian companies are demonstrated by the 
following examples. 
 
Servier, which places a high value on innovation and original research in its transnational 
R&D strategy, holds a majority ownership in Egis. The company’s goal, therefore, has been 
to maintain and improve the research capacities of Egis, and to integrate these into the 
company’s strategic projects. Due to the limited financial resources of Servier, Egis must 
compete for R&D funding with the other research centres of the holding. In many cases it 
means that Egis performs research only in specified phases of the project. The prospects of 
Egis for further funding for original molecule development have dramatically decreased since 
the failure of its Deram-ciclane molecule in the third phase of clinical testing. The R&D 
resources at Egis amount to 6-8% of its annual sales revenue. 
 
Sanofi-Winthrop Holding is the dominant professional investor in Chinoin. Although Sanofi 
supports the development of new products of Chinoin, the majority of the R&D activities are 
performed at its R&D centre in Gentilly, France. With a strongly centralised R&D strategy, 
Sanofi employs less researchers with higher research funding per head. Research at Chinoin 
focuses on molecules affecting the central nervous system and specific research tasks or 
performs research in specified phases of the project. 
 
Teva (and Orvet Gmbh) holds 98.9 and 99 percent stakes in Human and Biogal, respectively. 
Teva is one of he main generics providers of the world and it concentrates its resources in the 
development of only a few, strategic pharmaceuticals. Original R&D at Human and Biogal, 
therefore, does not have a high priority for the company. Teva has cut the number of research 
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personnel by 50% at Biogal, and implemented a major reorganisation at the R&D 
department. Biogal spends about 3-4% of its annual sales revenue on R&D – that is, way 
below the industry average –, mainly on specific small projects. The research activities of the 
company are co-ordinated form Teva’s headquarters.  
 
During the planned economy era, pharmaceuticals research was centralised at the 
Gyógyszerkutató Intézet. In 1998 Ivax purchased the majority of the company’s shares and 
research of the Gyógyszerkutató Intézet became part of the company’s global programme. 
The financial position of Ivax is more limited than that of the previous companies, and on a 
global scale it employs around 700 researchers to develop 30-50 generic and original 
medicines. Due to the limited resources of Ivax, the risk of financing these projects is also 
more substantial. Therefore funding for the Gyógyszerkutató Intézet’s own original molecule 
development programmes is very limited, and concentrated mainly in tumour-related 
medication. 
 
ICN (Valeant) holds the majority ownership in Alkaloida. Although Alkaloida was one of the 
most original-research-intensive companies in Hungary, from 1995 ICN has gradually 
decreased the number of research projects. Alkaloida produced substantial losses since the 
late 1990s, and thus the amount of R&D spending was decreased to only 0.7% of the annual 
sales revenues in 2001, and employment was cut, too. Currently, the resources of ICN allow 
only for the development of 2-3 original pharmaceuticals per year. This means that funding is 
generally not available for Alkaloida’s original development projects.  
 
These examples and Reiter (2005) suggest that the most important effects of foreign 
ownership on the R&D performance of the Hungarian companies are as follows. Besides the 
transfer of capital, foreign investment has also facilitated the transfer of modern technologies, 
and procedures like the in vitro method, as well as marketing, management know-how. Due 
to the financial strengths of the parent companies, funding for research have become 
available, and chances for developing a product from the original molecule and taking it to 
the market increased. The allocation of R&D expenditures has become more efficient and the 
exploitation rate of research results increased. Given these factors, the competitiveness of 
Hungarian companies has improved on the global market. Since the parent companies operate 
on a global scale, the risk of concentrating resources on one particular project at the 
Hungarian manufacturer has decreased, local projects, therefore, are more likely to be 
supported. As the Hungarian companies have become integrated to the global production 
networks of their parent companies, the possibilities for international co-operation increased. 
Also, the domestic companies have gained access to the international markets via the 
networks of their foreign owners. 
 
The foreign investors, however, have also significantly restructured the R&D system of their 
Hungarian affiliates. In most cases, R&D at the Hungarian companies have become a sub-
system in the global R&D programme of the parent companies, which determines in global 
terms what type of research is to be performed by the Hungarian subsidiaries. As a result, 
research at the Hungarian manufacturers is restricted to areas specified in the global R&D 
strategy, and it is even more so in the case of original research performed only in specific 
areas. New product development of the domestic companies has decreased, as well as the 
number of patent applications for original products, which is also due to the introduction of 
product patents (replacing process patents). The transition from the process-patent to a 
product-patent system has meant that Hungarian manufacturers have had to introduce a 
dramatically new approach to research. The range of products has also decreased in many 
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cases, because the parent company has replaced Hungarian products by its own products. 
Another visible effect has been that cooperation between domestic companies and 
universities has become more limited, and it is performed mainly in the field of developing 
analytical tests. 
Box 3.1 
R&D at a pharmaceuticals manufacturer 
The development of original drug molecules has always been in the focus of the company’s 
R&D strategy. R&D activities are performed in two departments, with a 25.4 m Euro budget 
allocated for each. The research department covers the quest for new, original drug-molecules 
and compounds, while the development department focuses on generic molecules. The 
research and the development department employ 600 and 150 researchers, respectively. The 
two departments’ activities are not strictly separated, they often co-operate on various issues. 
Both departments are engaged in the entire cycle of drug development. In case of original 
development, the cycle starts from the generation of the initial idea to the late clinical phase, 
through indication, identifying target molecules, compounds, pre-clinical and early clinical 
tests. In case of generic development, the cycle covers the process from monitoring available 
patents up to drug registration. These activities result in both product and process 
developments, as process development is required for the creation of each new substance, or 
drug formula. 
 
During the 2000-2004 period, the research department of the company went through a 
considerable transformation, which resulted in the improvement of scientific standards and 
accelerated the research projects. As of today, the company’s research activities match those 
of the leading pharmaceuticals companies of the world in terms research personnel, sectoral 
standards and research infrastructure. The bulk of the company’s revenues is generated by 
generic drugs, and thus day-today operation is based on the development of generic 
molecules. The composition of sales by original vs. generic products remained relatively 
constant in the past decade. In 2005, 17% of sales was generated by products stemming from 
the company’s original research, that is, the so-called innovative drugs, and 70% was 
accounted for by reproduction and generic products. A further 13% of the revenues was 
generated by products licensed by other international companies. The company launches 3-7 
generic drugs a year. 
 
Although R&D is seen as a key factor behind the company’s success, a number of factors 
have been identified as potential sources that hamper R&D.  The company sees the lack of 
appropriate financial resources as the biggest threat to its R&D activities, because the 
development of original molecules requires significant funds. Therefore the company signed 
mutually beneficial research agreements with a US-based laboratory to cooperate in the 
expensive clinical trial phase. Research and development in the industry has become a global 
activity, and a great importance is given to the collaboration agreements established by the 
company. The company seeks strategic partners to share the costs of clinical tests in the so-
called human phase, which requires large capital investment. 
 
The lack of appropriate personnel seems to be another threat for R&D. The supply of well 
trained experts in pharmaceuticals-related fields such as drug formula design, toxicology, and 
chemistry is insufficient in Hungary. This is due to the reason that natural science is not 
popular among students, and also because experts often move from the pharmaceuticals 
industry to environment protection agencies.  
  
18 
3.4. SUMMARY 
 
We can conclude that the pharmaceuticals industry is one of the best performing and most 
R&D intensive sectors of the Hungarian economy. However, the research system has gone 
through a number of substantial modifications since the early 1990s. The most important 
factor behind these changes is that foreign pharmaceuticals manufacturers became majority 
owners in most companies, who pursued an integrated R&D strategy at the global level. As a 
result, the number of research projects decreased, but the allocation of R&D expenditures 
became more efficient. New research projects at the Hungarian companies focus on the 
development of generic medicines and R&D on original molecules is rather limited.  
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4. SECTOR STUDIES: 
MANUFACTURE OF ELECTRICAL EQUIPMENT FOR ENGINES 
AND VEHICLES;  
MANUFACTURE OF PARTS AND ACCESSORIES FOR MOTOR 
VEHICLES AND THEIR ENGINES 
 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Automotive industry has traditionally been a front-runner in globalising its activities, 
originally in the forms of trade and licensing agreements, as early as the beginning of the 
twentieth century, and then in the form of cross-border investment projects. The main drivers 
for the major automotive firms to invest in new host countries are cutting costs via re-location 
of production, and gaining access to new markets in emerging economies. They have become 
rather active in Central Europe, too: practically all major automotive groups, both assemblers 
and component manufacturers, have already set up their operations in Central Europe, or are 
building their new plants. (Havas, 2000a, 2004; Pavlinek 2002a, 2002b; country studies for 
this project) Given these strategic moves, the Hungarian automotive industry has been 
radically re-shaped: car production started again in Hungary in the early 1990s – after a half-
a-century ‘recess’, and suppliers became parts of the global production networks, either via 
ownership or subcontracting relationships. In brief, new products are manufactured by new 
entrants or fundamentally transformed incumbent firms, using new production and 
management techniques, and serving new customers. 
Two sectors are analysed in detail in this report, because they are closely related: although 
statistically they belong to different sectors, in essence both of them are parts of automotive 
industry, broadly defined. One of them has been selected for this project because of its high 
R&D-intensity (in the Hungarian context), that is, manufacture of parts and accessories for 
motor vehicles and their engines (NACE 34.3). The other one has been chosen due to its fast 
growing R&D-intensity, namely, manufacture of electrical equipment (NACE 31.6). This 
latter sector covers the sub-sector called manufacture of electrical equipment for engines and 
vehicles (NACE 31.61) 
A methodological note is required here on the classification of various automotive sectors. 
Automotive component manufacturing was not considered a separate industry in international 
statistics until the 1980s. In the first decades of car manufacturing, independent companies 
supplied parts as a side business, along with machines, instruments, and parts for other 
transport equipment, such as bicycles and carriages. Later, car manufacturers either acquired 
their suppliers or established in-house production of components. Thus, information and 
statistics on this sector used to be subsumed under the automobile or motor vehicle industry. 
In the 1980s, however, automotive parts emerged as an important industry in its own right 
because of changes in technology, organisation and trade. The role of component suppliers 
increased not only in production but also in design; their technical and economic performance 
has became a key factor in the competition among car manufacturers. Thus, the sector has 
become an ‘entry’ in statistics due to its economic significance. A simple reason is that on 
average 10000-12000 parts are built into a car, accounting for some 50-70% of the 
manufacturing cost of an automobile. 
As a very wide range of products are used to assemble a motor vehicle – practically all 
industrial sectors supply the automotive industry –, readily available statistics are usually too 
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narrow in terms of coverage. In other words, quite a few automotive suppliers are classified 
as leather, rubber, plastics, paint, glass, cable or metal producing and processing companies, 
foundries, electrical and electronics companies, etc. The EU statistical classification also 
follows this line, i.e. motor vehicle parts and accessories (NACE 34.30) excludes engine and 
tyre manufacturers, most of the electrical and electronic components, as well glass, plastic or 
certain castings and other metal parts. 
The current Hungarian statistical classification system,8 practically in harmony with the EU 
methodology, identifies four automotive sub-sectors: 
manufacture of electrical equipment for engines and vehicles (31.61); 
manufacture of motor vehicles (34.10); 
manufacture of bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles (34.20), and 
manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles and their engines (34.30). 
As already mentioned, two of these sectors are analysed in this study, given the level and 
growth rate of their R&D activities: manufacture of electrical equipment for engines and 
vehicles (31.61) (henceforth: electrical automotive components), and manufacture of parts 
and accessories for motor vehicles and their engines (34.30) (henceforth: manufacture of 
automotive components). Although these names might suggest that these two sectors cover at 
least the majority of automotive suppliers, this is not the case: just as in the EU statistics on 
the automotive components sector, a wide range of products are excluded (e.g. engines, tyres, 
glass, plastic, castings and other metal parts as well as bulbs). For this reason available 
statistics only included 150-160 firms in the early 1990s, while experts estimated that 
altogether some 300-350 companies were producing motor vehicle parts and components in 
Hungary.9 Partly due to a better statistical coverage, and in part due to a genuine increase in 
the number of companies, the 2001 data already covered some 250 firms in the two sectors 
are analysed here, namely 3161 and 3430. 
The share of the automotive components industry in the national GDP has grown to 0.8% by 
2003, thanks to a healthy growth in its production value (from 1000 m euro in 1998 to 2049 
m euro in 2003). 
The private R&D expenditures in NACE 34.3 amounted to 12.5 m euro in 2004, up from 4.2 
m euro in 1998. The share of R&D expenditures of the automotive components industry in 
the total BERD amounts to 4.2%, that is, 5.2% of the private R&D expenditures in the 
manufacturing industry. 
                                                 
8
 It was introduced in 1992. Previously components manufacturing, in line with the previous international 
methodology, was treated as part of the automotive industry. 
9
 The primary producers are Rába (diesel engines and axles for commercial vehicles), Bakony Művek (electrical 
parts), MMG (instrument panels), PEMŰ, TVK, Kaloplasztik, Kunplast (all plastic parts), Perion (batteries), 
IMAG (seats, wiring harnesses), Videoton (printed circuits, electrical parts and wiring harnesses), Knorr-
Bremse (brakes), ADA, Pre-cast and Le Belier (all foundries), GE Tungsram (lighting) and Taurus (rubber 
parts). Besides these long-established Hungarian companies – some of them already privatised by foreign 
investors as their new names suggest – well-known foreign companies have also set up their subsidiaries, e.g. 
Akzo (paints), Ford (electrical parts), Cascade and Happich (plastic parts), Denso (fuel pumps), ITT Automotive 
(electrical parts and wiring harnesses), Michels Kabel (wiring harnesses), Packard Electric (electrical parts and 
wiring harnesses), UTA (wiring harnesses), VAW (castings) and ZF (gearboxes). The major customers are the 
local car assemblers, Western European carmakers and their first-tier suppliers, as well as North American 
commercial vehicle companies. 
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The number of researchers has more than doubled since 1998. The total number of 
researchers was 367 (head counts) in 2004, which represents around 4% of the total number 
of researchers in the private sector. 
The share of the other electric equipment industry – essentially electrical equipment for 
engines and vehicles – in the national GDP has reached to 0.3% by 2003, thanks to a healthy 
growth in its production value (from 317.5 m euro in 1998 to 1092 m euro in 2003). 
The private R&D expenditures in NACE 31.6 amounted to 2.9 m euro in 2004, up from 0.4 
m euro in 1998. The share of R&D expenditures of the electrical automotive components 
industry in the total BERD amounts to 1%, that is, 1.2% of the private R&D expenditures in 
the manufacturing industry. 
The number of researchers has increased 2.5 times since 1998. The total number of 
researchers was 85 (head counts) in 2004, which represents around 1% of the total number of 
researchers in the private sector. 
At several points in this paper, data for another automotive sub-sector, namely manufacture 
of motor vehicles (34.1), are also presented to facilitate a brief comparison between 34.1 and 
34.3. R&D data for the third sub-sector belonging to the NACE 34 group, namely 
manufacture of bodies (coachwork) for motor vehicles; manufacture of trailers and semi-
trailers (NACE 34.2) cannot be presented due to the data protection regulation: less then 3 
companies are pursuing R&D activities in this sub-sector. 
 
 
4.2. PATTERNS, NATURE AND SOURCE OF R&D 
 
R&D data are available at a 2-digit sectoral level only for 5 sectors in Hungary, including 
manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus (NACE 31), but not including 
manufacture of transport equipment (that is, motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers; NACE 
34). R&D data at a 3-digit level are not published at all. The Hungarian Central Statistical 
Office, however, has kindly provided data on BERD at a 3-digit sub-sectoral level, free of 
charge, to assist our team in selecting the four sectors for this project. As funding for 
purchasing further data – e.g. R&D employment, major data for calculating concentration 
ratios to describe the structure of the selected sectors, has not been made available, as a first 
approximation we rely on these data, i.e. BERD – to characterise recent trends in R&D in 
these two sub-sectors. 10 This dataset are completed with a third sub-sector, namely 
manufacture of motor vehicles (NACE 34.1), in order to provide a background to compare 
car and components manufacturing (34.1. vs. 34.3). (Table 4.1) 
 
                                                 
10
 NACE 31 includes manufacture of lighting equipment and electric lamps (NACE 31.5), which is a major 
industry in Hungary, due to the operations of a large company, that is a subsidiary of GE Electric, used to be 
called Tungsram. Presenting publicly available data on R&D expenditures and employment at a 2-digit level 
(NACE 31) would be misleading for the purposes of this report, due to the huge difference in terms of the 
dynamics – strategy, technological and market opportunities, industry structure and other major drivers of R&D 
activities – in sub-sectors 31.5 and 31.6. 
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Table 4.1: BERD in three sub-sectors producing automotive products, 
2001-2004 (current m HUF) 
 2001 2002 2003 2004 
NACE 31.6 567,978 416,243 1,645,404 3,543,586 
NACE 34.1 3,076,905 944,181 1,272,561 3,379,996 
NACE 34.3 1,573,872 1,722,505 4,253,237 2,301,585 
Source: CSO 
Eurostat, however, is publishing data on intra-mural R&D expenditures and on R&D 
employment for all these three sub-sectors at a 3-digit level, as well as BERD data at a 2-digit 
level for the Hungarian automotive industry (NACE 34) since 1998. (Tables 4.2-4.5) Two 
caveats are in order. First, it needs to be emphasised – what is already said – that Eurostat 
data at a 3-digit level refer to intra-mural R&D expenditures, not BERD, and thus CSO data 
and Eurostat data are not comparable. Second, the 2003 figure for intra-mural R&D 
expenditures in sub-sector 34.1 represents an unrealistic jump, that is, nearly a 50-times 
higher amount. (This figure is highlighted by a yellow background in Table 4.4) This sudden 
jump makes one curious, indeed, as R&D personnel actually shrunk in the 34.1 sector in 
2003. 
 
Table 4.2: R&D indicators of Manufacture of electrical equipment n.e.c. (NACE 31.6), 
and Manufacture of electrical equipment for engines and vehicles n.e.c (NACE 31.61), 
Hungary, 1998-2003 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total intra-mural R & D expenditure (m €) 0.4 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 2.0 
   of which 31.61 0.4 0.9 1.0 0.9 : : 
Total number of R & D personnel (head) 39 65 48 87 99 80 
      of which 31.61 36 60 46 81 : : 
Share of R&D exp. in value added (%); 31.6 : : 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.5 
Share of R&D exp. in value added (%); 31.61 : : 0.5 0.3 : : 
Share of R&D employment in the number of 
persons employed (%); 31.6 : : 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 
Share of R&D employment in the number of 
persons employed (%);31.61 : : 0.3 0.5 : : 
Source: Eurostat 
: not available 
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Table 4.3: R&D indicators of Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
(NACE 34), Hungary, 1998-2003 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
BERD (m €) 5.5 7.4 6.2 18.3 11.1 21.8 
Total number of R&D personnel (head) 301 308 381 524 990 433 
Share of R&D expenditure in value added (%) : : 0.6 1.1 1.3 11.1 
Share of R&D employment in the number of 
persons employed (%) : : 1.1 1.4 2.7 1.1 
Source: Eurostat 
: not available 
 
Table 4.4: R&D indicators of Manufacture of motor vehicles (NACE 34.1), Hungary, 
1998-2003 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total intra-mural R & D expenditure (m €) 0.5 2.1 1.0 4.2 3.0 144.4* 
Total number of R & D personnel (head) 145 77 26 123 114 106 
Share of R&D expenditure in value added (%) : : 0.1 0.6 0.4 17.4 
Share of R&D employment in the number of 
persons employed (%) : : 0.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 
Source: Eurostat 
: not available 
* probably a mistake 
 
Table 4.5: R&D indicators of Manufacture of parts, accessories for motor vehicles 
(NACE 34.3), Hungary, 1998-2003 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Total intra-mural R & D expenditure (m €) 4.2 4.2 5 8.2 13.7 15.5 
Total number of R & D personnel (head) 156 189 294 331 869 327 
Share of R&D expenditure in value added (%) : : 1.2 1.7 2.8 2.7 
Share of R&D employment in the number of 
persons employed (%) : : 1.3 1.3 3.4 1.2 
Source: Eurostat 
: not available 
 
Tables 4.6-4.7 indicate that one of these sectors, namely 31.61 was significantly below the 
national average of the manufacturing industry in 2000-2001, if R&D-intensity is measured 
by the share of R&D expenditures in value added, but closer to that average when R&D 
employment is taken as a measure. This simple exercise suggests that R&D expenditures per 
R&D employees were much lower in this sub-sector than the national average in the given 
period. One should also bear in mind, however, that data are missing from the Eurostat 
database for 2002-2004, and this sub-sector has been selected for our study exactly for the 
high growth rate of R&D expenditures: almost a 7-times higher amount in 2004, compared to 
2001. (Table 4.1) Thus, available data do not permit to draw firm conclusions as far as the 
R&D-intensity of this sector is concerned. 
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NACE 34.1 presents a similar case: lower R&D-intensity then the manufacturing industry 
average when it is measured in expenditures, but a higher one when employment is taken into 
account. (The dubious 2003 R&D expenditures figure is disregarded here.) 
 
In contrast, NACE 34.3 is way above the national manufacturing average (2 and 5 times 
higher intensity), if either measure is taken; actually, that has been the selection criteria for 
this sub-sector. In this case, both CSO and Eurostat data point to the same conclusions (as the 
selection has been made on the basis of CSO data). Given the strong performance of this sub-
sector, the automotive industry at a 2-digit level is close to the Hungarian manufacturing 
industry average when R&D expenditures are taken into account, and 4 times above that 
average if employment figures are taken as an indicator. 
 
Table 4.6: Share of R&D expenditure in value added (%), 
Hungary, 2000-2003 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Manufacturing (NACE D) 1.5 1.3 1.4 : 
NACE 31.61 0.5 0.3 : : 
NACE 34 0.6 1.1 1.3 11.1 
NACE 34.1 0.1 0.6 0.4 17.4 
NACE 34.3 1.2 1.7 2.8 2.7 
Source: Eurostat 
: not available 
 
Table 4.7: Share of R&D employment in the number of persons employed (%), 
Hungary, 2000-2003 
 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Manufacturing (NACE D) 0.7 0.5 0.7 : 
NACE 31.61 0.3 0.5 : : 
NACE 34 1.1 1.4 2.7 1.1 
NACE 34.1 0.3 1.2 1.1 1.1 
NACE 34.3 1.3 1.3 3.4 1.2 
Source: Eurostat 
: not available 
EU25 data on the R&D-intensity of the above sectors are not available in the annual detailed 
enterprise – or structural business –statistics of Eurostat, and thus R&D-intensity of the above 
Hungarian sectors cannot be compared to the EU25 average. 
As part of the European TrendChart on Innovation project, European Sector Innovation 
Scoreboards have also been compiled for EU15 countries. (Hollanders and Arundel [2005]). 
Using 12 indicators, a so-called innovation sector index (ISI) has been computed, to rank 
sectors (a t a 2-digit level) by their innovation performance. Automotive industry ranks five, 
with its 0.57 ISI. The top four sectors are electrical and optical equipment (0.63); information 
ad communication technologies (0.61); computer services and related activities (0.59); 
chemicals and chemical products (0.58). Of the 12 indicators used to compare sectoral 
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innovation performance, only one is available for the Hungarian sectors manufacturing 
automotive products, namely R&D expenditures as percentage of value added. The average 
for the automotive industry in EU15 countries is 7.6% for this indicator (as opposed to 1.7% 
for all NACE sectors), that is, around 5 times higher than the Hungarian one at a 2-digit level 
(NACE 34), and almost 3 times higher than the R&D-intensity of NACE 34.3 in Hungary. 
 
4.3. DETERMINANTS OF R&D 
 
4.3.1. Traditions of the Hungarian Car and Car Components Industries 
4.3.1.1. Craft production before 1945 
Cars, first assembled from imported kits, have been produced in Hungary since 1903. 1905 
saw the first car designed and built by a Hungarian engineer, János Csonka. Bus 
manufacturing started in 1909. Preparation for World War I sparked production of cars, 
trucks, and engines. Ravages of war and The Great Depression hindered the sector in the 
1920s. Recovery started in the 1930s, including the assembly of Ford models under a licence 
agreement. Motorcycle production commenced in the 1930s, too. First imported kits were 
assembled but local content had increased to ninety per cent by 1935. World War II boosted 
production again, particularly for military vehicles (Berend and Ránki, 1955, 1958). All the 
major car parts – engines, gears, and chassis – had also been produced in Hungary until the 
mid-1940s. In other words, Hungary’s vehicle manufacturers have not been mere assembly 
units of foreign companies, but have accumulated skills in automotive engineering, building 
upon a long tradition in mechanical engineering. 
Hungarian engineers were rather successful in R&D in the pioneering period of the industry. 
The most notable ones were János Csonka and Donát Bánki who substantially improved the 
internal combustion engine in many ways in the 1880s and 1890s. Their most significant – 
but hardly acknowledged – achievement was the invention of the carburettor in 1893. Bánki 
also designed a new engine that raised efficiency fifty percent. These R&D results, however, 
were not commercialised in a large scale production in Hungary. Not even the carburettor, 
what was re-invented by Maybach in Germany two years later, and that version became 
known all over the world. 
4.3.1.2.  Heritage of the CMEA 
 
Automotive production facilities were ruined during the war. Manufacturing of motorcycles, 
buses, lorries and other commercial vehicles resumed after the war.11 Car production, 
however, was abandoned under a new industrial policy, which shaped Hungary’s industrial 
structure to a CMEA-wide division of labour. The new policy first was influenced informally 
by Soviet advisors working in Hungary and then by a formal Soviet-Hungarian specialisation 
agreement signed in 1964. The accord co-ordinated the two countries’ industrial development 
projects, including automotive manufacturing, in the wider context of CMEA. It also 
stipulated that Hungary would specialise in producing buses for the entire CMEA.12 Ikarus, 
                                                 
11
 Private companies - like in all other sectors, and in all other countries in the Soviet block - were nationalised 
by the late 1940s. Corollaries of nationalisation and central planning - most notably lack of competition - are not 
of sector specific, and thoroughly analysed in the literature, hence not discussed here. 
12
 For a detailed analysis of the impacts of the agreement and the ‘Central Automotive Development 
Programme’ see Bauer et al. (1980), Bauer and Soós (1980), Soós (1980) and Tárnok and Vince (1980). 
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Hungary’s bus manufacturing firm became one of the largest in Europe, turning out some 
14,000 units a year in the 1980s.13 
Bus manufacturing provided an excellent opportunity to make use of the considerable assets 
and skills accumulated in car components manufacturing companies, in spite of the lack of 
car manufacturing since the late 1940s. Hungarian suppliers also shipped car parts to other 
CMEA countries since the 1960s.14 Certain automotive components, e.g. engines, axles, 
undercarriages and tyres for commercial vehicles as well as bulbs, batteries and dash boards 
for cars, were also exported for hard currencies (to Western Europe, the US and India). 
As for R&D, hardly any original project was conducted in this period in a sharp contrast with 
the pre-war era. The pace of technological improvement was set by CMEA demand. Needless 
to stress how different these requirements were compared to those of advanced countries, 
given the severe shortage of cars and the lack of rigorous safety and environmental 
regulations. The only counterbalancing factor was that CMEA car manufacturers, expect 
Skoda, based their product development strategy on Western licences since the 1960s. Hence, 
their suppliers’ products were also based on Western licences. The most advanced product 
and process technologies, however, were not made available through these licence 
agreements. In other words, it was a ‘safe’ way to maintain or even widen the technological 
gap. In fact, due to the lack of incentives to innovate – that is, no import competition at all, 
extremely long queues for effectively rationed cars, lack of up-to-date safety and 
environmental rules – CMEA car producers were happy in the 1980s with their 30-40-year 
old technologies. Their Hungarian suppliers, therefore, had hardly any opportunity and 
incentives to innovate, either. Those suppliers, however, that exported their products for hard 
currencies had no other choice than to continuously improve their products through up-to-
date Western licences (e.g. from Bosch, MAN, KNORR, ZF, Girling, Lucas) and adaptive in-
house R&D projects. 
 
 
4.3.2. Re-emerging Car Production in Hungary 
 
Hungarian government officials had long intended to re-establish car industry for two basic 
reasons. First, the severe shortage of cars was rather annoying in this reformed planned 
economy – often referred to as ‘goulash communism’ in Western media. This shortage 
resulted in an ageing, obsolete car population. (Havas, 1997) Second, the government also 
viewed car manufacturing as a means of industrial modernisation, with its exacting technical 
and organisational requirements. Industrialists also backed the idea as a major step toward 
integration into the world economy – and as another golden opportunity to obtain big slices 
of investment funds from the government. Eventually, two consortia were set up by 
Hungarian companies to promote the re-establishment of car industry in the late 1980s. 
One question has, however, divided this apparently unified camp of promoters, namely 
whether to opt for large scale manufacturing of components for major car producers or to 
                                                 
13
 Production was still 12,350 and 11,980 units in 1988 and 1989, respectively. Collapse of CMEA has caused a 
dramatic drop: output fell to 7,994 in 1990, and almost every year has seen a further decline since then. Output 
was a mere 1,576 units in 1994 and 1,162 buses in 1998, dropped to around 100 in the early 2000s. 
14
 The single most important buyer has been the (former) Soviet VAZ (Lada) factory. Other significant 
customers have included the Polish FSO and FSM (Polski Fiat) companies as well as Dacia in Romania. 
Although (the former) Yugoslavia never joined the CMEA, Hungarian parts were also shipped to her car 
producer, Zastava (now in Serbia) until the UN embargo in the late 1990s. Given the lack of sectoral statistics 
for that period, data on aggregate automotive sales to the CMEA are not available. 
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assemble cars again, after a rather long interval, lasting for almost 50 years.15 It was also an 
open and much debated question whether to try to mount assembly operations within the 
framework of the CMEA, or in co-operation with the advanced countries. While the 
government pondered the issue, two foreign car companies – Suzuki and GM Opel – looking 
for favourable new locations and market opportunities, ‘resurrected’ the Hungarian car 
manufacturing in the early 1990s. 
 
Magyar Suzuki, a Japanese-Hungarian joint venture located in Esztergom, some 50 km of 
Budapest, commenced commercial production of compact cars in October 1992. Investment 
has totalled $260 million by 1997. Then a further $146 million has been invested to produce a 
new small car, jointly developed with GM, but assembled separately under Suzuki and Opel 
badges in Esztergom and Gliwice, Poland, respectively. The Suzuki version is called Wagon 
R+, and its production is commenced in January 2000. The other new model, called Ignis, 
was introduced in April 2003. It also means, that output will reach 100 thousand units a year. 
Diesel engines were also added to the product lines in November 2003.16 
 
Opel Hungary Vehicle Manufacturing Ltd. opened the other Hungarian car assembly plant 
and an engine factory in a customs-free zone at Szentgotthárd, close to the Austrian border, in 
1992, too. Initially GM Opel had invested over DM400 million. Opel Astras were produced 
in Hungary until December 1998.  
As for the engine factory, its original capacity had been doubled to 460,000 units a year (i.e. 
around one-fourth of the total European production of Opel), and cylinder heads had also 
been added to the product lines due to further investment projects completed by 1996, worth 
of DM47 million, and DM210 million, respectively. Actual output primarily depends on 
demand for Opel models in Western Europe as the vast majority of production had been 
exported to Opel assembly plants even in until 1998 (when cars were assembled in 
Szentgotthárd), and 100% is exported since then.  
A third car producer joined in 1998. Originally Audi AG has invested in Hungary in a new 
engine manufacturing plant, its first 100 per cent-owned manufacturing base outside 
Germany. Audi Hungaria Motor Kft (AHM), located in Győr, western Hungary, was opened 
in October 1994. Two new sport models, TT Coupé and Roadster have been assembled since 
April 1998, and July 1999, respectively, at AHM. A third model, A3 was added in 2001. 
Output has been increased in several steps, and further engine components have also been 
added to the product lines.  
 
 
4.3.3.  Industrial Structure 
Automotive industry recently has been radically re-structured due to a globally diffusing 
organisational innovation, often called lean production. One of the most important novel 
features of lean production, and surely the most relevant one from the point of view of this 
study, is the new way to arrange and manage the assembler-supplier relationships, in other 
words, the new set of values and goals behind it. Unlike in Fordist mass production, it is 
based on trust and the realisation of the importance of co-operative efforts. A wide range of 
information, therefore, is almost continuously exchanged among assemblers and suppliers so 
                                                 
15
 These confronting opinions are described in more detail, e.g., by Somai (1993) and Varga (1990). 
16
 For more details on these 3 cases, see the separate report on companies. 
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as to improve efficiency by joint efforts. Different forms of financial, managerial and 
technological assistance are also provided by the assembler. The key notion is co-operation, 
in contrast to trade secrecy and mistrust between ‘enemies’, that is, assembler and supplier, in 
the Fordist mass production paradigm, given their fierce price war. Borrowing analogies from 
game theory, suppliers and assemblers are engaged in a zero-sum game in Fordist mass 
production, while in lean production both of them are interested in, and working for, 
enlarging the ‘cake’, i.e. increasing profits to be distributed among them. 
Another distinctive feature of the lean supply chain is its pyramid-like structure. In its 
original Japanese version, first-tier suppliers are tied to assembler(s) through ownership, 
usually with a minority stake, interlocking cross share-holdings and personnel links. Their 
tasks include not only manufacturing of certain parts and components but product design as 
well, either together with their assemblers or on their own.17 As for manufacturing of a given 
part, though, usually more than one suppliers are chosen, and hence they are competing for 
orders. Supply quota and target price, based on thorough, jointly conducted cost calculations 
and full exchange of all the relevant production and market information, are set in advance in 
multi-year contracts.18 Constant cost-cutting is not only anticipated, given learning effects, 
but deliberately planned, moreover, even fixed in the supply contract. Extra savings, 
stemming from further improvements achieved by suppliers, however, can be retained as 
profits, and thus incentives for additional cost-reducing innovations are built in into the 
system. Suppliers’ performance is regularly evaluated using multiple criteria such as quality, 
design, delivery and price. Supply quota, and thus profits, are awarded among suppliers 
according to the result of these evaluations. 
First-tier suppliers have also built their network, usually consisting of 20-60 firms. These 
second-tier suppliers, in turn, rely on thousands of small and medium-sized enterprises, 
producing basically simple, labour-intensive products given their wage advantages compared 
to larger firms. 
These general trends have had significant impacts in Hungary, too. The car assemblers follow 
their own version of the lean production paradigm.19 A number of foreign-owned T1 suppliers 
have also set up plants in Hungary, either via green-field plants, or by taking over Hungarian 
firms. Most of the indigenous companies, however, are T2 and T3 suppliers, with the 
exception of Rába. 
Concentration ratios can be easily calculated by the Central Statistical Office (CSO), but 
funds have not been made available to this project to commission the CSO to conduct those 
computations. The industrial structure, therefore, can only be characterised in a qualitative 
manner. 
 
 
                                                 
17
 In the latter case they might well work with other firms and various R&D institutes, of course. The point is, 
that the assembler only defines the main parameters of a given part or component, e.g. its size and required 
technical performance, and leaves the whole design process to its supplier. 
18
 In sharp contrast with the short-term contracts in the Fordist mass production system, the time span of these 
contracts often extends to the entire model life (what is in most cases considerably shorter than in Fordist mass 
production, though). 
19
 For more details, see the separate company reports. 
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4.3.4.  Key Business Players and Ownership Patterns 
 
Some of the key business players are characterised in the separate company reports. As for 
the other ones, it is worth classifying them by their ownership. A wide variety of ownership 
forms can be observed. 
 
A) Dominant Foreign Ownership 
A.1 Green-field investments with 100 per cent foreign ownership. For the purpose 
of further analysis, it is useful to identify two sub-sets in this group: 
A.1.1 Subsidiaries of car manufacturers: AUDI Hungaria Motor Kft., Visteon 
Hungary Kft (Ford), Opel Hungary 
A.1.2 Subsidiaries of component manufacturers: e.g. Continental Teves (ITT 
Automotive Hungary before 1998), Lear (formerly United Technologies 
Automotive Hungary), Denso, Hydro Aluminium Győr Kft (previously VAW), 
Michels Kabel, Keiper-Recaro 
A.2 ‘Brown-field’ investments: former state-owned companies privatised by foreign 
investors, e.g. Knorr-Bremse, (Delco) Remy, ZF 
B) Dominant Hungarian Ownership 
B.1 State-owned companies 
B.2 Privatised former state-owned companies:20 e.g. Bakony Művek Rt., MMG 
Automatika Rt., Perion Akkumulátorgyár Rt. 
B.3 Private companies, i.e. firms established by Hungarian entrepreneurs, e.g. ABF 
Bowdentechnika Kft 
B.4 Joint ventures with dominant Hungarian private ownership, e.g. RATIPUR 
Car Equipment Co. 
Individual companies can be relatively easily classified using these categories, although some 
companies might have started with green-field sites and taken over existing plants as a 
brown-field investment at a later stage as they extended their activities in Hungary – or the 
other way around, e.g. Bosch. As for a more rigorous quantitative analysis at a sectoral level, 
however, a number of methodological problems arise. First, it is needless to stress that 
ownership changes have been quite frequent in these sectors, especially until the late 1990s, 
and hence the overall picture, i.e. the ratio of different ownership forms, has been constantly 
changing. Therefore, from the point of view of economic analysis, it is a ‘moving target’. 
Second, given the lack of readily available statistics, it is not possible to precisely establish 
the ratio of private and state ownership. While seven distinct types of owners are recognised 
in the Hungarian statistics, namely the state, municipalities, domestic individuals, domestic 
corporations, ESOP, foreigners and co-operatives, published statistics only provide figures on 
state-owned and foreign-owned equity. Moreover, one category of ownership – namely 
‘domestic corporations’, that is, share holding and limited liability companies – does not 
distinguish private and state ownership.21 Bearing in mind these methodological limitations, 
                                                 
20
 Privatisation has been usually conducted as a combination of ESOP (employee stock ownership programme) 
and MBO (management buy-out) projects. In some cases it has only been partial, i.e. a certain share of state 
ownership has been retained, especially in the first stage of privatisation. 
21
 Therefore an apparently legitimate formula, assuming that the municipality-owned assets are almost 
negligible, and thus the ratio of private ownership equals 100% minus state ownership minus 2-6% for 
municipality stakes, would lead to deceptive results. 
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available statistics do suggest a dominant share of private (in particular foreign) ownership in 
both sectors. Data are presented separately for two different periods, namely 1992-1997, and 
1998-2003, for methodological reasons (see Tables 4.8-4.11). 
 
Table 4.8: Ownership changes in the manufacture of electrical automotive components 
(31.61), 1992-1997 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Equity (m HUF) 2,065.8 832.6 842.7 918.4 9,624.0 2,569.6 
  Of which: foreign ownership 121.1 166.5 276.2 505.4 9,282.7 2,200.0 
  State ownership 1,537.2 154.0 154.0 15.0 15.1 13.2 
Share of foreign ownership (%) 5.9 20.0 32.8 55.0 96.5 85.6 
Note: Only double-book-keeping companies are included 
Source: Ministry of Industry and Trade and author’s calculations 
 
Table 4.9: Ownership changes in the manufacture of electrical automotive components 
(31.61), 1998-2003 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
Equity (m HUF) 14,968 16,525 23,442 28,421 24,613 37,666 
  of which: state (including 
municipalities) 0 0 0 0 0 3 
             foreign 12,222 13,067 19,540 24,360 20,536 33,382 
Share of foreign ownership (%) 81.7 79.1 83.4 85.7 83.4 88,6 
Source: Ecostat and author’s calculation 
 
Table 4.10: Ownership changes in the manufacture of parts and components for motor 
vehicles (34.30), 1992-1997 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Equity (m HUF) 19,657.8 21,831.8 22,400.9 23,598.9 27,478.5 40,173.6 
  Of which: foreign ownership 2,517.8 3,348.1 4,029.3 6,080.8 8,669.8 22,246.8 
  state ownership 9,130.3 9,051.4 7,190.5 5,434.6 4,389.6 338.0 
Share of foreign ownership (%) 12.8 15.3 18.0 25.8 31.6 55.4 
Note: Only double-book-keeping companies are included 
Source: Ministry of Industry and Trade and author’s calculations 
 
Table 4.11: Ownership changes in the manufacture of parts and components for motor 
vehicles (34.30), 1998-2003 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Equity (m HUF) 60,631 69,396 69,536 75,634 57,374 63,522
  Of which: state (including 
municipalities) 445 445 445 445 
804 804
             foreign 45,048 51,336 53,099 58,622 41,272 46,948
Share of foreign ownership (%) 74.3 74.0 76.4 77.5 71.9 73,9
Source: Ecostat and author’s calculation 
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4.3.5.  Patterns of Competition 
Although car assemblers, first- (T1), second- (T2) and third-tier (T3) suppliers are all 
necessary to constitute a production network, and in the end of the day they all share the 
network’s destiny, they have different responsibilities in the division of labour in a given 
network, and they have to face different type of risks. Therefore, it is necessary to analyse 
them somewhat separately – but also keeping in mind the strong and close ties among them. 
 
4.3.5.1. Evolving strategies for car-makers to improve competitiveness 
Car-makers have to face a strong competition and mature markets in their traditional area of 
operation. Moreover, they are not – and in the foreseeable future most likely they will not be 
– in the position to expect a ‘breakthrough’ from this trap relying on any technological 
breakthrough. Thus they have to devise and implement other strategies: 
• cutting costs in order to keep existing markets via offering lower prices, 
• introducing new features, offering new functions (e.g. safety, comfort, global positioning 
systems, recycling) as well as improving reliability and fuel economy, 
• creating new market segments in long-established, mature, markets by introducing e.g. 
sports models, four-wheel-drive cars, light trucks, minivans, 
• finding new markets with new customers and ideally less intense competition, 
• introducing organisational innovations to improve flexibility, shorten lead and delivery 
times,22 
• customising mass-produced models, that is, offering the opportunity to buyers to ‘design’ 
their own car, using, of course, a set of standardised components.23 
In short, price is still the bottom line of competitiveness in the car industry, yet many more 
characteristics have become a must for car-makers. Two of the above strategic elements are 
the most relevant from a Central and Eastern European point of view: cost-cutting and 
entering new markets. 
Cost-cutting is a decisive element of basically all car-makers’ strategy. That is why they set 
up their new plants in South America, South-East Asia as well as Central and Eastern Europe 
(CEE), where production costs are usually lower than in their established bases, and for the 
same reason they encourage their suppliers to follow them, and/or to find other ways to offer 
cheaper parts and components. Another way of cost-cutting is to introduce improved 
production equipment and vehicle components (that is, incremental technological 
innovations, as opposed to radical innovations) as well as more efficient production processes 
                                                 
22
 Lead times - once constituting a major competitive edge for Japanese carmakers - have become rather short, 
thanks to the introduction of lean production, where T1 suppliers are involved in the design of new models, and 
the so-called rugby approach is used - instead of the former ‘relay’ method - among the various departments 
involved in designing a new model. (Graves (1991), (1994)). This new phenomenon underlines the importance 
of organisational innovations, too. 
23
 No doubt, it requires a great deal of flexibility in terms of manufacturing and logistics, and, in turn, might lead 
to longer delivery time and higher costs. Therefore organisational innovations, coming either from carmakers or 
T1 suppliers, are of crucial importance. Quite often, though, technological innovations are necessary 
preconditions of organisational innovations, e.g. improved flexibility obviously requires organisational 
innovations, which, in turn, usually necessitate an appropriate, customised new IT tool kit and/or improved 
production equipment. 
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(organisational and managerial innovations).24 In the lean production paradigm – as opposed 
to the Fordist one – suppliers are important sources of innovations, and new products, 
processes and managerial techniques are spread quickly throughout the whole network 
(assembler, T1, T2 and T3 suppliers). 
Emerging markets are also considered to be important because by definition they promise 
new buyers. Moreover, in the late 1980s CEE countries were fairly abandoned, that is, 
competition among car-makers was practically unknown, on the contrary, buyers had to 
‘compete’ with each others and distributors for cars. Hence, most cars were rather obsolete in 
these countries, making people even more ‘hungry’ for new cars. In short, it seemed to be a 
Paradise for car-makers. However, this region has become crowded in a very short period of 
time because quite a few major W European, US and Asian companies have invested in 
production facilities. To make it worse, optimistic sales forecast have not materialised either, 
as most people cannot afford new cars, especially in the potentially largest markets, i.e. in 
CIS countries. The current crisis in SE Asia puts car-makers into an even more intense 
competition globally. 
The three car-makers operating in Hungary apply different elements of the above strategic 
mix. Magyar Suzuki assembles small cars. In this segment, profit margins are rather low 
because the main competition axis is price. Suzuki also puts emphasis on fuel economy, and 
hence organises special rallies where the most economical drivers are awarded. From time to 
time small, special batches are produced to appeal to a certain customer group. New models 
have already been introduced to replace the outdated original model, and further ones are to 
be added to the product lines in the coming years. As they belong to the same segment, 
competitiveness is also based on price, as well as fuel economy; yet, design features play a 
more important role than in the 1990s. 
Opel has decided to abandon car assembly in Hungary. Its new strategy is focusing on low 
cost manufacturing of high-tech, high-value-added components – engine components, 
engines and gearboxes – as well as low-cost, high-quality R&D conducted in Hungary to help 
improve its overall competitiveness. In short, it is a global strategy with carefully planned 
division of labour among various Opel plants across countries. 
AUDI Hungaria Motor, besides producing engines in large volumes for the entire VW group, 
assembles its two new sports models in Győr, aimed at serving a special market segment of 
the affluent young professionals, primarily in the Western European markets. In this segment, 
design – technical and aesthetic features – is the key element of the competition. Yet, price 
should be kept as low as possible, and flexibility is even more important than in the case of 
‘normal’ cars because of seasonal cycles in demand. Hence, Hungary seems to be an ideal 
production base with skilled but cheap workers and flexible labour regulations compared to 
Germany. 
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 A successful concept of cost-cutting is the so-called platform strategy whereby the basic components of 3-5 
models are shared, and thus economies of scales in producing those elements and product variety - that is, 
apparently different models serving different markets (or segments) - can be achieved simultaneously. This 
concept requires the introduction of a set of interrelated technological and organisational innovations. 
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4.3.5.2. Competitive strategies of suppliers 
T1 suppliers are increasingly similar to car assemblers in many respects, and thus they have 
to face a similar – competitive, global – environment. Reliable quality, continuous cost-
cutting – with all its methods and prerequisites discussed above –, timely delivery, the ability 
to innovate and manage the rest of the supply chain are all indispensable for survival. 
Therefore, it is hardly possible to single out any distinctive, new competition axis. T2 and T3 
suppliers, however, have less responsibilities, the main competition axis for them is price. 
Nonetheless, all of them should be able to maintain reliable quality and timely shipment of 
parts and introduce the technological and organisational innovations developed by assemblers 
or T1 suppliers. 
These general observations apply to the Hungarian case, too. T1 suppliers – e.g. Continental 
Teves (former ITT), Knorr-Bremse, UTA, ZF – serve the global markets from their 
Hungarian production bases, only an almost negligible fraction of their output is shipped to 
the local car assembly plants. In the beginning, their primary concern was cost-cutting in the 
production phase. Gradually, however, they have recognised that Hungarian engineers and 
researchers at various R&D units can provide useful services for their internationalised R&D 
projects, too, at a rather low cost. Therefore, they have already set up their own, in-house 
R&D units or decided to do so. Continental Teves is a somewhat exceptional case. Initially 
its small Hungarian R&D unit mainly worked for the German subsidiary, not for the local 
one. Since 2001, however, it has been extended, and become responsible to develop sensor 
technologies at a European scale, and thus also works for the Hungarian subsidiaries. The 
other way is to ‘delegate’ Hungarian engineers into the parent company’s global research 
teams. UTA, for example, has not opened an in-house R&D unit, its engineers, however, are 
involved in a number of R&D projects run by various subsidiaries of the parent company. 
Sometimes they work abroad, at other times they work from Hungary, sending and receiving 
data electronically. 
As for the intensity of competition in the local market, it should be taken into account that 
some 10-12 thousand parts and components are used to build a vehicle. To put it simply, an 
engine manufacturer, say, might account for a very large share of the sector’s output, yet, it 
does not mean that it would dominate, say, a seat manufacturer, who, in turn, has a much 
smaller share of the sector’s output. 
As for a more qualitative overview, there is a strong competition in the automotive 
components manufacturing. Although some companies might have a relatively large 
domestic market share, e.g. in the case of axles, batteries, bearings or lighting, they also have 
to face a fierce competition in their export markets, and given the relatively small size of the 
Hungarian market as well as the importance of scale economies, they cannot avoid exporting 
the bulk of their output. The only exception is engine manufacturing: the combined capacity 
of Audi and Opel is around 2 million units a year, and thus it is a large enough market for 
their suppliers. That is why foreign foundries and machining companies are setting up their 
Hungarian operations (e.g. ADA, Pre-cast, Le Belier, Hydro [originally VAW] and Jung). In 
this case, there is strong competition for the ‘domestic market’. The engines produced in 
Hungary, in turn, are shipped to the various car assembly plants of Audi, VW (including 
SEAT and Skoda) and GM Opel in Europe. 
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4.3.6. Production Networks: Sources of innovation 
Relying on a survey conducted in the mid-1990s, as well as on a series of interviews and case 
studies conducted in the late 1990s, and then in 2002-2004, two major lessons can be drawn. 
First, the Hungarian case confirms the general picture emerging from the literature, namely 
car assemblers and their T1 suppliers are the most important sources of innovation for the 
entire production network they coordinate. Second, some buyers, or their first-tier foreign 
suppliers, provide licences and know-how free of charge for T2 and T3 suppliers. The most 
important example was Magyar Suzuki in the 1990s (also offering various forms of financial 
assistance for tooling-up). This is the major element of an explanation to reconcile the 
apparent contradiction between the low level of expenditures on technology related activities 
and the introduction of relatively large number of new products and processes.25 In other 
cases, however, it is a prerequisite to buy certain licences or know-how, otherwise there is no 
business. 
As already mentioned, Hungarian automotive suppliers have to adjust to a radically altered 
international and domestic environment (import liberalisation, loss of former markets, new 
players in Hungary, etc.). Thus, those who want to survive have also introduced new 
management techniques. The most important types of these innovations are total quality 
management and reliable cost accounting. Foreign partners usually provide technical 
assistance and training courses to facilitate the introduction of these techniques. 
Managerial innovations can be analysed at a sectoral level, too, as opposed to individual 
company level. In the lean production system, first-tier suppliers assume a considerable part 
of responsibility for product development as well as for organising and managing the supply 
chain (logistics) as they build and supply sub-systems, rather than individual components. In 
other words, they are responsible for second-tier – and indirectly – for third-tier suppliers’ 
performance, too. Thus, they also provide training, technical assistance to their suppliers to 
facilitate the introduction of an appropriate quality management, cost accounting, production 
and delivery systems, etc. More recently Western car-makers follow this way, i.e. they cut the 
number of their first-tier (direct) suppliers and give them more responsibility. 
This ‘tiering’ has hardly occurred in Hungary until the early 1990s. One should not be 
surprised, however, as most Hungarian companies have supplied simple, individual parts, 
rather than complex sub-systems to their customers. Moreover, they have not been involved 
in product development, either, as the models produced by Audi Hungaria, Magyar Suzuki 
and Opel Hungary had been designed before their assembly started in Hungary. One should 
take into account that it was a relatively new concept even for the Western European 
managers until the mid-1990s. A detailed analysis of the British automotive industry in that 
period also claimed, that British managers had a long way to go, too, on the road leading 
towards ‘tiering’: 
By collaboration, the first tier of suppliers may help to develop the value chain of vehicle 
manufacturer or the progress and competitiveness of a national or regional industry. There has 
been little such activity so far: indeed the major UK suppliers could more accurately be called 
an unconnected group, rather than a first tier. (DTI and SMMT (1994), p. 11) 
Their Hungarian counter-parts, however, first had to learn even the ‘simple’ techniques of 
market economy, too, not only these new principles of lean supply. Moreover, in the 
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 Another major factor is that these innovations represent low- or mid-tech technologies, rather than high-tech 
ones, and hence financially they are less demanding. 
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meantime they also had to struggle for survival. More recently, however, some preliminary 
signs of the emerging new supply system can be observed in certain cases. As subsidiaries of 
major Western component manufacturers are taking on board more Hungarian suppliers, a 
more pronounced ‘tiering’ can be observed. For example, ZF has developed a supplier park 
around its plant in Eger. In short, T1 suppliers assume responsibility in organising the supply 
chain in Hungary, too, following the global patterns. 
 
 
4.4.  IMPACT OF R&D AND INNOVATION 
 
No studies are readily available on the impacts of R&D in these sectors. As already 
emphasised, though, technological and organisational innovations, brought in by foreign 
firms, and diffused to their indigenous suppliers, have played a major role in re-structuring 
these sectors. The following sub-section, relying on available data at sub-sector level, 
characterise these fundamental changes, reflected in various performance indicators. It is 
assumed that innovation has contributed to improved performance to a significant extent. 
Sales have significantly increased in both sectors, analysed in detail in this report: the 2003 
output of electrical automotive components was around 13 times as much as in 1992, and the 
other sector – from a much higher absolute level – grew almost 7 times bigger than in 1992, 
using constant [1992] price data.26 (For current price data, see Tables 4.12-4.13.) The export 
intensity of these sectors is also worth noting, particularly in the case of the electrical 
automotive components (3161), where the ratio of exports to sales further increased from an 
already high level: from 58 per cent in 1992 to 90.2% in 2003. Thus, it can be established 
beyond doubt that these companies face a fierce competition: given the globalised nature of 
the automotive industry and the liberal import regime there is a strong rivalry in their 
domestic market, and they also face harsh competition in their export markets, where the bulk 
of their output is shipped. Moreover, their financial performance has significantly improved, 
too, i.e. they are not ‘buying’ export markets at the expense of their profits.27 Thus, their 
impressive growth in 1992-2003 is even more remarkable. Figures indicate that the 
underlying factor of their success is improved labour productivity: measured as value added 
per employees, in real terms it has increased by 2.5 times in the electrical automotive 
components sector (31.61), and doubled in the other one (34.30).28 Another ‘proxy’ for labour 
productivity can be sales per employees; then one can observe a 3.6-fold increase in the case 
of electrical automotive equipment, and a 3.5-fold improvement in the case of automotive 
components (using constant price figures). Case studies, conducted a few years ago, suggest 
that this noteworthy improvement is thanks to the introduction of new processes and 
management techniques, and in a number of cases due to the modernisation of equipment, 
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 Constant 1992 prices have been calculated by taking into account producer price indices for these two sectors, 
or for some years the nearest available ones, e.g. indices for the sector 316, instead of the ones for 3161. 
27
 Yet, the profitability of the components sector (3430) – measured as net profits/sales – was rather low until 
1997, and fluctuating in the range of 8.6-10.6 per cent since 1998. The other sector (3161) is rather volatile in 
this respect: it was in the red until 1995, then fared quite well in 1996-2000 (with a net profit/sales ratio between 
6.9 and 10.7 per cent), and performing significantly below that level since 2000 (e.g. a 4.6 per cent profitability 
in 2003). 
28
 GDP implicit price indices have been used to ‘deflate’ current price value added figures. Of course, only an 
indication of real term value added figures can be calculated in this way; a proper method would be to use GDP 
deflators at a sectoral level, but those indices are not available. That is why another indicator is also used here: 
sales per employees, using sectoral producer price indices to calculate real term sales figures. 
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too, reflected in the increase of assets (by around 7 times, in both sectors, using historical 
asset pricing). 
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Table 4.12: Manufacture of electrical automotive components (31.61), 1992-2003 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2003/1992* 
Number of companies 32 39 41 42 49 57 61 62 60 69 72 78 243.8% 
Sales (m HUF**) 8,208 16,408 27,655 38,578 63,539 95,486 133,741 191,706 236,945 250,648 212,794 280,396 3416.1% 
  of which: exports (m HUF) 4,758 4,983 16,923 28,150 54,588 85,367 107,173 155,498 216,253 226,586 190,115 252,983 5317.0% 
Exports/sales (%) 58.0 30.4 61.2 73.0 85.9 89.4 80.1 81.1 91.3 90.4 89.3 90.2 155.6% 
Employment (average, heads) 5,658 6,464 7,070 7,619 10,667 13,189 14,888 16,622 23,630 17,605 19,409 20,033 354.1% 
Pre-tax profits (m HUF) -1,070 -558 -1,405 -1,527 4,815 9,243 10,050 13,845 26,395 16,713 9,870 18,307 380.2% 
Net profits (m HUF) -1,140 -651 -1,487 -1,625 4,512 9,100 9,661 13,147 25,386 15,506 8,450 13,037 288.9% 
Assets (m HUF) 8,218 11,628 12,113 14,730 21,638 28,916 35,790 44,243 52,640 65,207 46,185 60,066 730.9% 
Value added (m HUF) 2,098 4,466 7,634 8,785 19,980 32,565 38,802 49,968 59,726 62,848 60,311 80,163 3820.9% 
Sales/employee (m HUF) 1.5 2.5 3.9 5.1 6.0 7.2 9.0 11.5 10.0 14.2 11.0 14.0 964.8% 
Value added/employee (000 HUF) 370.8 690.9 1,079.8 1,153.0 1,873.1 2,469.1 2,606.3 3,006.1 2,527.5 3,569.9 3,107.4 4,001.5 1079.2% 
Net profits/sales (%) -13.9 -4.0 -5.4 -4.2 7.1 9.5 7.2 6.9 10.7 6.2 4.0 4.6 65.5% 
Value added/sales (%) 25.6 27.2 27.6 22.8 31.4 34.1 29.0 26.1 25.2 25.1 28.3 28.6 111.8% 
Source: Ecostat and author’s calculation 
* In case the 1992 data are negative, 1996 is used as a base year 
** Current prices, throughout the table 
Table 4.13: Manufacture of parts and accessories for motor vehicles and their engines (34.30), 1992-2003 
 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2003/1992* 
Number of companies 88 116 118 132 137 155 165 173 178 180 176 179 203.4% 
Sales (m HUF**) 24,335 32,272 40,949 62,217 85,814 146,793 218,670 273,930 358,961 412,528 398,180 522,915 2148.8% 
  of which: exports (m HUF) 14,053 17,689 23,038 40,377 56,655 105,615 172,223 223,116 309,087 331,985 346,287 445,015 3166.7% 
Exports/sales (%) 57.7 54.8 56.3 64.9 66.0 71.9 78.8 81.5 86.1 80.5 87.0 85.1% 147.4% 
Employment (average, heads) 14,238 14,914 15,091 15,490 16,574 19,485 21,753 22,079 22,436 24,720 22,189 26,673 187.3% 
Pre-tax profits (m HUF) -77 582 1,014 3,292 3,107 8,743 23,989 31,231 41,907 39,470 41,059 58,772 10098.3% 
Net profits (m HUF) -154 318 889 3,030 2,751 8,303 23,098 27,795 37,402 35,471 36,914 49,879 15685.2% 
Assets (m HUF) 24,040 24,891 26,133 28,310 48,116 70,095 93,983 105,267 117,025 149,364 141,699 169,020 703.1% 
Value added (m HUF) 9,243 11,523 14,631 20,123 24,520 40,486 62,089 79,961 102,648 117,089 114,445 147,709 1598.1% 
Sales/employee (m HUF) 1.7 2.2 2.7 4.0 5.2 7.5 10.1 12.4 16.0 16.7 17.9 19.6 1147.0% 
Value added/employee (000 HUF) 649.2 772.6 969.5 1,299.1 1,479.4 2,077.8 2,854.3 3,621.6 4,575.1 4,736.6 5,157.7 5,537.8 853.0% 
Net profits/sales (%) -0.6 1.0 2.2 4.9 3.2 5.7 10.6 10.1 10.4 8.6 9.3 9.5% 968.0% 
Value added/sales (%) 38.0 35.7 35.7 32.3 28.6 27.6 28.4 29.2 28.6 28.4 28.7 28.2% 74.4% 
Source: Ecostat and author’s calculation 
* In case the 1992 data are negative, 1993 is used as a base year 
** Current prices, throughout the table 
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4.5.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Automotive investment activities across borders have significantly intensified in recent years 
in an attempt to cut costs via re-location of production, and to get closer to the ultimate 
customers in emerging markets. Central Europe, the immediate neighbourhood of Hungary is 
no exception either: the region has moved again onto the global stage. Almost all major 
automotive groups, except some leading Japanese automotive firms – Nissan and Mitsubishi 
– have already set up their operations in Central Europe. These intensified investment 
activities have had crucial bearings on the Hungarian automotive industry: after a half-a-
century interval – imposed by the CMEA-wide division of labour – car production has re-
emerged in Hungary in the early 1990s. Suppliers have also invested heavily in Hungary. 
Moreover, their motivation has not been simply to follow car assemblers – to serve them 
from nearby plants –, on the contrary, this is only a minor part of the explanation. Their 
principal reason for setting up subsidiaries – either green- or brown-field plants – in Hungary 
has also been cost-cutting. The only major local clients for them are not car assemblers but 
the engine manufacturing plants of Audi and GM Opel, hence the vast majority of their 
output is exported. 
These strategic moves have radically re-structured the indigenous suppliers, too. In other 
words, transition has been accomplished in this sector. Some suppliers have been taken over 
by foreign firms, while others have been integrated into the global networks of major 
automotive groups as subcontractors. In both cases new products, processes and management 
techniques have been introduced quite rapidly. Data clearly show that components 
manufacturing is much more important than car assembly, even from a somewhat narrow-
minded macroeconomic point of view: turnover, employment and exports figures are 
significantly larger in the former sector than in the latter. Taking a more general perspective, 
that is, industrial development and competitiveness, suppliers, and particularly the 
networking activities of T1 suppliers, are still more substantial: it is mainly due to them that 
new technologies and organisational innovations are diffusing fast and widely in Hungary. 
From a policy point of view, however, it is necessary to take into account the differences 
between various types of suppliers. Therefore, a taxonomy has been developed. 
Foreign investors have chosen Hungary partly because skilled labour is relatively cheap – 
around one seventh of the German wages. Yet, had wages alone been sufficient to improve 
competitiveness, Western automotive firms would have gone to Ukraine and other CIS 
countries, where labour is even significantly cheaper. In fact, what really matters is that 
Hungarian workers are highly skilled, due to a German-type vocational training system in 
place for many decades. As quality, reliability and productivity are all major concerns for 
automotive companies, there is no need to emphasise the importance of skills and experience. 
In short, the real advantage is the excellence of workers coupled with low wages. Further, 
foreign companies find flexible employment conditions in Hungary; shift work and overtime 
working is a commonplace, offering investors a production regime to suit their needs. Grants 
and concessions offered by the government – to ease the annoying shortage of cars and 
facilitate industrial re-structuring – has also been instrumental to attract foreign investors. 
 
A brief comparison of production paradigms has also shown the crucial importance of 
innovation, R&D and engineering skills. Given the excellence of the Hungarian higher 
education system, there is no shortage of engineers endowed with these skills and knowledge. 
Interviews suggest emerging co-operation between automotive firms, on the one hand, and 
university departments as well as other R&D units, on the other. More recently, some foreign 
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investors – e.g. Audi, GM Opel, ITT, Knorr-Bremse and ZF – have also realised the world-
class knowledge of Hungarian scientists and engineers, and they are setting up either their in-
house R&D units or joint research groups with universities. Again, besides professional 
excellence, there is a considerable cost advantage in this field, too. Further, in the second half 
of the 1990s, R&D schemes were also applied to foster innovation activities in the 
automotive industry, and a new one was launched in 2006. 
In sum, the successful re-structuring of the Hungarian automotive industry is not only due to 
some ‘push’ factors, i.e. the fierce competition among automotive companies and hence the 
pursuit of cost-cutting via re-location of their production, but it also thanks to ‘pull’ factors, 
i.e. the attractions of the Hungarian economic environment, broadly defined. Given the ever 
changing, and global, nature of the automotive industry, no country can be complacent, on 
the contrary, continuously renewed, concerted efforts and well-devised policy measures are 
needed to achieve further results. 
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Statistical annex for international comparisons 
 
Table 4. 14: Economic weight of Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-
trailers (NACE 34), EU25 vs. Hungary, 2000-20002 (%) 
 2000 2001 2002 
EU 25 HUN EU 25 HUN EU 25 HUN 
Share of value added in manufacturing total 7,4 12,8 7,9 10,8 7,7 10,1 
Share of employment in manufacturing total 6,3 4,4 6,4 4,2 6,4 4,2 
Source: Eurostat 
 
 
Table 4. 15: Apparent labour productivity: Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and 
semi-trailers, (NACE 34), EU25 vs. Hungary, 2000-20002 
 2000 2001 2002 
EU 25 HUN EU 25 HUN EU 25 HUN 
Gross value added per employee 52,6 36,1 56,4 31,1 54,9 34 
Labour cost per employee 
(unit labour cost) 40,3 7,7 41 9,7 43,7 11,7 
Source: Eurostat 
 
 
Table 4.16: Motor vehicle parts and accessories (NACE 34.3) 
Labour productivity, personnel costs and gross operating rate: 
ranking of the top 3 Member States, 2002 
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5. SECTOR STUDY:  
MANUFACTURE OF MEDICAL AND SURGICAL EQUIPMENT 
AND ORTHOPAEDIC APPLIANCES IN HUNGARY 
 
 
5.1.  PATTERNS, NATURE AND SOURCE OF R&D 
 
The manufacture of medical and surgical equipment and orthopaedic appliances (NACE 
33.1) is the most dynamically developing and most R&D intensive sub-division of the 
manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks (NACE 33) 
industry in Hungary. Its share in the national GDP has reached to 0.1% by 2003, thanks to a 
healthy growth in its production value, albeit from a low absolute number (from 94 m euro in 
1998 to 194 m euro in 2003). The private R&D expenditures in NACE 33.1 amounted to 1.5 
m euro in 2004, up from 0.8 m euro in 1998. The share of R&D expenditures of the medical 
instruments industry in the total BERD amounts to 0.5%, that is, 0.6% of the private R&D 
expenditures in the manufacturing industry. The number of researchers has increased by four 
times since 1998. The total number of researchers reached 214 (head counts) in 2004, that is, 
around 2.4% of the total number of researchers in the enterprise sector. 
 
Although the other 4 sub-divisions of the manufacture of medical, precision and optical 
instruments, watches and clocks (instrument engineering) industry exhibit different dynamics 
with respect to performance and R&D, the analysis below relies on two-digit level data in 
some cases, when a more detailed division is not available. 
 
The value added generated by the EU25’s total instrument engineering industry amounted to 
€48.7bn or 2.8 per cent of the industrial value added in 2001, and the industry employed 
1,002 thousand persons, equivalent to 2.8 per cent of the industrial employment. Labour 
productivity reached €48,600 per employee at the average personnel cost of €34,900 per 
employee. The manufacture of medical and surgical equipment and orthopaedic appliances 
sub-division generated 35 per cent (€17.2bn) of the 2-digit industry’s value added, which 
amounted to 1 per cent of the industrial value added. Germany and France were the biggest 
contributors to this amount with a 39 per cent and a 12 per cent share, respectively. The 
medical instruments industry employed 40 per cent (401 thousand persons) of the total 
employment of the instruments industry, which was 1.1 per cent of total industrial 
employment. By 2003, production of the EU25’s medical engineering sector increased to 
€184bn, which means that European manufacturers produced nearly one third of the world’s 
medical instruments. (Eurostat, 2005) 
 
Similar tendencies can be observed in Hungary, where the medical instruments industry 
proved to be the most R&D intensive division of the instruments engineering industry. 
Generally, the instruments engineering sector performed well with respect to the specified 
R&D indicators. Although the medical industry produced the highest value indicators in the 
sector, other sub- divisions, especially the manufacture of office machinery and computers, 
and the manufacture of radio, television and communication equipment and apparatus also 
exhibited high R&D intensities and growth. 
 
R&D expenditures in the medical instruments industry amounted to 272.8m HUF in 2001, 
490.8m HUF in 2002, 550.1m HUF in 2003 and 229m HUF in 2004. This means that 
contributions from the industry generated between 0.5 and 0.9 per cent of the Hungarian 
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economy’s overall R&D expenditure. The growth rate of R&D expenditures in the sector was 
well above the national average with over 10 per cent in the past five years. The average 
R&D intensity of the sector during the 2001-2004 period reached 0.9 per cent in terms of 
sales revenues and 2.7 per cent in terms of sectoral GDP. The growth rates of these intensities 
were 2.51 per cent and 34.1 per cent from 2001 to 2003. The sector’s output amounted to 
0.11 per cent of the national GDP. On the basis of these results, R&D expenditure in the 
medical instruments industry was higher and grew faster than the average of the instruments 
engineering sector. Consequently, it became one of the most R&D intensive industries of the 
Hungarian economy. 
 
Longer time series is available only on the evolution of business enterprise financed R&D in 
the Hungarian instruments sector (2 digit level).  
 
Table 5.1: BERD in the Hungarian instruments sector, 1995-2003 (m HUF) 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 
BERD 1,068.4 1,021.7 1,979 1,929 1,328.8 2,596.2 2,234.7 2,425.2 2,333.7 
Source: author’s calculations from CSO data 
 
The above figures show that businesses generated nearly 2.2 times as much R&D expenditure 
in 2003 than in 1995. This indicates a steady increase during the 9-year period, even though 
expenditures decreased slightly in some of the observed years. The share of R&D expenditure 
of the instruments engineering sector in the total Hungarian R&D expenditure amounted to 
3.9 per cent in 2001, 4 per cent  in 2002 and 3.6 per cent  in 2003.  
 
For a more detailed analysis of the industry’s production performance, labour productivity 
and R&D performance, data in most cases are available only at the two-digit (instruments 
engineering) level. Table 5.2 compares the performance of instruments engineering industry 
in Hungary and the EU25 total. 
 
Table 5.2: Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and 
clocks in 2002 
 EU25 Hungary 
Turnover (m euro) 12,3686 662 
Production (m euro) 11,6670 541 
Value added (m euro) 48,735 225 
Gross operating surplus (m euro) 16,217 86 
Number of persons employed (1000) 1,002 22 
Personnel costs (m euro) 32,518 140 
Labour productivity (1000 euro/head) 48.6 10.5 
Average personnel costs (1000 euro/head) 34.9 7.9 
Gross operating rate 13.1 13.0 
Source: Eurostat 
 
The contribution of the Hungarian instruments engineering is rather marginal to the EU25’s 
production. It produced 0.46 per cent of the production value and the value added, and 
employed 2.2 per cent of employees of the EU25’s instruments engineering sector. Since the 
share of the Hungarian industry was higher in employment than in production, it proved less 
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productive than the EU25 industry. EU25 labour productivity (measured as value added per 
head) was 4.5 times higher than that of Hungary, although labour costs were also higher by 
nearly the same proportion. 
 
Data on the evolution of the Hungarian instruments industry’s production and sales volumes 
are also available.  
 
Table 5.3: Evolution of the Hungarian instruments industry, 2003-2005 
Percentage change* 
in the volume of 
2003 2004 2005 
Gross output 120.0 114.1 94.3 
Total sales 107.5 112.1 94.2 
     Domestic sales 104.7 110.3 87.0 
     Export sales 110.5 114.0 101.8 
* previous year = 100 % 
Source: CSO data 
 
The share of the sector’s production was also relatively small in comparison to the Hungarian 
manufacturing industry. In 1998, it produced 1 per cent of total manufacturing production, 2 
per cent of total manufacturing value added and claimed 2 per cent of total manufacturing 
employment. Since that time, the industry started to grow dynamically. Until 2005, the 
volume of production increased by 15 per cent and sales increased by 10 per cent per annum 
on average. Table 5.3 shows that exports grew faster in every year than domestic sales, and 
thus the bigger part of the increase in sales can be attributed to the expansion of exports. 
 
Table 5.4 presents the main production performance indicators of the Hungarian medical 
instruments industry and the instruments engineering sector in 1998. The manufacture of 
medical instruments generated 31 per cent of the output, 30 per cent of the value added and 
was responsible for 32 per cent of employment in the 2-digit sector. These indicators do not 
only highlight the importance of the medical instruments industry within instruments 
engineering, but also show that the structure of the industry is similar to that of the EU25. (At 
the EU25 level, the sub-division produced 35 per cent of the output and value added (in 
2001) with 40 per cent of the workforce of the 2-digit sector.) The industry performed worse 
in terms of costs and productivity than the average of the 2-digit industry. However, while 
unit labour costs were 12 per cent lower in the medical instruments industry, labour 
productivity was only 6 per cent lower than in the instruments engineering sector. 
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Table 5.4: Overview of the Hungarian medical instruments and instruments 
engineering industries, 1998 
 Manufacture of 
medical instruments 
Instruments 
engineering 
Number of persons employed 
(1000) 4.8 15.0 
Production value (m euro) 94.1 301.5 
Value added (m euro) 36.6 122.4 
Gross operating surplus (m euro) 13.8 42.6 
Personnel costs (m euro) 22.5 79.8 
Labour productivity 
(1000 euro/head) 7.6 8.1 
Unit personnel costs  
(1000 euro/head) 4.8 5.4 
Social security costs/ total 
personnel costs (%) 27.1 27.2 
Source: Eurostat 
 
Tables 5.5-5.6 present detailed, not readily available information on the evolution of the 
medical instruments industry between 1997 and 2002.29 It must be noted that the medical 
instruments industry consist of a large number of companies, that differ substantially with 
respect to their size, production profile and strategy. 
 
While employment in the industry increased by 30 per cent from 1997 to 2002, value added 
increase by 75 per cent and net sales revenues have doubled during this period. Pre-tax profits 
amounted to ten times as much in 2002, than their 1997 value (all data in current price). 
Exports played a determinant role in the increase of net sales revenues, as export sales have 
also nearly doubled. Since earnings grew faster than employment, labour productivity also 
increased. Sales per employee increased from 4.4m HUF in 1997 to 6.6m HUF in 2002, and 
the growth of value added per employee was even more spectacular from 1.8m HUF to 2.5m 
HUF. The fairly stable profits/sales and value added/sales ratios from 2000 indicate that 
revenues and profits grew at a similar pace in the end of the period. The R&D expenditure 
per employee indicator shows that R&D was funded at a rather stable and low level, even in 
the end of the period. (Sub-division level R&D data is available only from 2001.) Between 
2000 and 2002, 1 - 1,5 per cent of the sales revenues were spent on R&D in the medical 
instruments industry. 
 
                                                 
29
 Calculations are based on data from companies on double entry book keeping and employing more than 10 
people. 
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Table 5.5: Overview of the Hungarian medical instruments industry, 1997-2002 
 
 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Number of 
employees 4016 4452 3965 4050 4158 5241 
Net sales revenue 
(bn HUF) 17.8 23.8 22.3 26.7 27.2 34.8 
Net export revenue 
(bn HUF) 7.8 12.1 10.9 12.8 13.9 15.5 
Pre-tax profits 
(bn HUF) 2.1 2.0 14.7 n.a. 19.4 22.4 
Value added  
(bn HUF) 7.5 8.4 7.5 9.0 10.3 13.1 
Equity 
(bn HUF) 6.4 6.2 7.2 6.2 6.3 7.0 
Loans* 
(bn HUF) 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.2 0.1 0.5 
Foreign ownership 
(% of equity) 16.8 11.0 15.8 19.7 23.7 26.6 
State ownership 
(% of equity) 7.5 18.1 14.6 7.0 5.5 4.9 
* loans specifically for investment and development purposes 
Source: author’s calculation from CSO data 
 
Table 5.6: R&D intensity and efficiency of the Hungarian medical instruments industry, 
2000-2002 
 
R&D 
expenditure/ 
employee* 
Sales/ 
employee* 
Value added/ 
employee* Profits / sales 
Value added / 
sales 
2000 0.07 6.6 2.2 - 0.33 
2001 0.11 6.5 2.5 0.71 0.38 
2002 0.1 6.6 2.5 0.64 0.33 
*m HUF/head 
Source: author’s calculation from CSO data 
 
It is interesting to note, that despite its profitability, the medical instruments industry did not 
attract as much foreign investment as other high growth potential industries in the Hungarian 
economy. The share of foreign ownership remained around one-fourth of the industry, which 
is quite low compared to the rest of R&D-intensive industries. The share of state ownership is 
nearly negligible in the industry. Another interesting feature is that companies in the industry 
practically did not use loans to finance their investments and development projects. 
 
 
5.2. 2. DETERMINANTS OF R&D 
 
EU25 level statistics suggest that the evolution of the instruments engineering sector was 
fairly stable between 1993 and 2004, with an annual average growth rate of production of 3.3 
per cent. At the same time, production of the whole of electrical machinery and optical 
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equipment sector grew by 5.5 per cent on average, while the growth rate of total industrial 
production reached only 2.8 per cent. 
 
Generally, instruments engineering is classified as a high-tech industry and companies in the 
industry rely heavily on continuous product innovation. There are three main reasons for this. 
First, the demand for durable goods is strongly correlated with the overall condition of the 
economy, and manufacturers face a volatile demand if market conditions deteriorate. In this 
case, demand can be boosted by the development of new, superior products. The second 
reason is that competition from Far Eastern manufacturers has increased dramatically during 
the past decade and this has created a continuous pressure for EU manufacturers for product 
development. Third, new technological standards and regulations have been introduced, 
which are especially relevant in the case of the medical instruments industry.  
 
One of the most important events in this respect was the adoption of Directive 2004/22/EC by 
the Council and the European Parliament in March 2004 on the manufacturing of measuring 
instruments. The aim of the directive is to harmonise the production of ten categories of 
measuring instruments within the EU, and introduce a regulatory framework, which complies 
with the relevant international standards. The new regulation facilitates that manufacturers 
can apply different conformity assessment procedures and promotes technological 
innovation. 
 
A large number of companies constitute the Hungarian medical instruments industry, which 
differ substantially with respect to their size, financial and R&D capacities, as well as 
strategies. The most prominent medical manufacturers are represented by the Association of 
Hungarian Medical Manufacturers and Service Providers, founded in 1994. The association 
consists of 50 members, from four main fields of the industry: production of medical 
instruments, surgical equipment, laboratory equipment and materials, and therapeutic and 
rehabilitation materials and services. All the member companies are manufacturers or service 
providers in the above fields, in Hungarian majority ownership and hold a significant market 
share. The two main activities of the association are to serve as the representative body of 
interests of the members, and support their activities on the international market.  
 
MEDICOR is the oldest and largest representative of the Hungarian medical instruments 
industry. The company was established more than four decades ago and its main activities 
include R&D, manufacturing and distribution of medical equipment. The company focuses 
on the mid-price segment of the primary health care market in Hungary and on its 30 export 
markets. The company’s contracts and projects generate €56.3m per year, of which amount 
90 per cent is performed on the export markets. The main individual activity of MEDICOR is 
the manufacturing and distribution of different diagnostic X-ray configurations. MEDICOR 
has developed a network of partner companies, each specialising in the production of 
equipment for specific fields only. The company also distributes the products of the partner 
companies, including paediatric (Neonatal) devices, disposable products, functional 
diagnostic equipment, surgical instruments and operating theatre equipment. 
 
MEDICOR Elektronika Rt, with sales revenues between 400 - 600m HUF, and share equity 
of 100m HUF is a decisive member of the MEDICOR Group. The company is in a 100 per 
cent  Hungarian private ownership. The company is engaged in independent technical 
development and production of a wide-ranged of medical equipment for both domestic and 
foreign markets. The main product groups include hospital equipment and home appliances 
as well. Within the group of hospital products, the company focuses on the production of 
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infant medical, and infusion equipment and its main products include neonatal incubators, 
neonatal warm up and resuscitation tables, blue-light lamps, apnoea alarm devices, infusion 
pumps, ECG Holter and EEG devices, gels and electrodes. The main products of the home 
equipment business are blood pressure meters, physiotherapy stimulators, body thermometers 
and infant respiration monitors. 
 
Innomed Medical Rt is one of the biggest and the most innovative medical instruments 
manufacturing companies in Hungary. The company employs 220 persons in Hungary, and 
exports to 106 countries all over the world. The main activity of the company includes the 
development, distribution and service of medical equipment. The company focuses on the 
development of the following product groups: heart screening and Holter systems, 
defibrillators, monitoring systems and x-ray equipment. During its 27 years of operation, the 
company has demonstrated its commitment for the production of innovative medical 
equipment on many occasions. This resulted in an international recognition for the 
company’s products as well as in a number of prizes and awards in Hungary. These include 
the XIV. Innovation Grand Prize by the Hungarian Patent Office in 2005, for the INNOSPOT 
1000 T/TM pulmonary x-ray station. The development of the same product was also granted 
69m HUF support from the GVOP Programme (National Development plan). The 
professional performance of the company was also acknowledged by an award by the 
Ministry of Economy and Transport in 2005.  
 
  
51 
 
Box 5.1 
R&D at a medical equipment manufacturer 
 
The scope of research activity includes the development of new products and the adaptation 
of licensed products to the home market. In both cases, the results are utilised in the form of 
new products and processes. The main research objectives are to develop medical equipment 
and devices in the field of radiology and cardiology. The share of software-development has 
also increased during the past few years. The company feels that knowing the needs of their 
customers is a major contributor to the success of their product and process development 
activities.  
 
The company’s R&D unit employs 35 engineers, mainly mathematicians and physicists. 
Most of their researchers have multiple degrees (in various fields). On average, 10 
researchers produce 2 innovations. This very well-trained personnel can independently 
manage the entire development process regarding new possibilities in the field of radiology 
and cardiology. The company cooperates with universities in many R&D projects. 
Competition is severe among the companies of the industry to attract well trained personnel, 
therefore providing sufficient motivation for the staff in the form of wages is a key challenge 
for the company. 
 
The company’s strategy is to reinvest its profits in order to provide sound financial 
backgrounds for R&D. R&D is seen as a key contributor to the company’s success as a 
significant share of the company’s turnover is generated by its own product innovations.  
R&D also plays a crucial role in pursuing the basic strategic concepts of the company: cost 
reduction, enhanced competitiveness and adaptation to new environmental regulations. All 
three activities are strongly linked to the company’s R&D performance. 
 
The company could significantly benefit from national and EU-financed R&D grants that 
support R&D, but based on the company’s experience, these schemes operate as obstructive 
factors because of their slow, ex-post financing and the long evaluation process. This means 
that enterprises with less capital resources have no chance for taking advantage of these R&D 
grants. The company expects that indirect financial measures, such as the preferential 
treatment of software-development in 2006 will foster the company’s R&D activities. On the 
other hand, abolishment of the tax allowance on the costs of medical equipment for family 
doctors is likely to decrease demand substantially, which, in turn shall hamper R&D 
activities. 
 
 
 
5.3. 3. SUMMARY 
 
Unfortunately further data is not available for the analysis of the effects of R&D on the 
performance of the Hungarian medical instruments industry. Studies and sectoral analyses 
that systematically analyse the relationship between R&D and company performance are not 
available. Occasionally press releases and studies that examine the general state of R&D in 
Hungary shed some light on certain aspects of the issue.  
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On the basis of the above analysis we can conclude that the manufacture of medical 
equipment is truly an R&D-intensive industry. The R&D-intensity of the sector is not only 
higher than that of the whole electrical and optical instruments sector but it also produces 
higher growth. These tendencies are in line with the changes that can be observed in the 
industry at the EU25 level. 
 
The most important trends in the world’s medical instruments industry play a determining 
role in the innovation activities of the Hungarian companies. These trends include the 
increasing use of IT systems for the support of medical equipment, the revolution of digital 
imaging equipment and the expansion of the home-use appliances market. Besides research 
and development of the traditional equipment, Hungarian medical equipment manufacturers 
proved successful in the development and application of these product families. 
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This report has been written as part of an ETEPS project analysing private sector R&D 
activities in the new EU member states. As a first contribution, data availability and 
reliability have been assessed in Hungary. The Hungarian Central Statistical Office (CSO) 
has been collecting R&D data since 1969. During this 40 year period, data collection and 
publication methods had changed several times: the Recommendations Concerning the 
International Standardisation of Science and Technology by the UNESCO had been followed 
since 1978, then the Frascati Manual (OECD) from the early 1990s (with practically full 
compliance since 199630), and its most recent, EUROSTAT compatible version from 2002. 
 
More recently, innovation surveys are also conducted in Hungary by the CSO. The first, pilot 
innovation survey, following the harmonised OECD-Eurostat guidelines (Community 
Innovation Survey, CIS) was conducted in 2000. Then, the Hungarian CIS survey was run in 
2002, covering the period of 1999-2001. A CIS Light survey, conducted in 2004, and the 
Hungarian CIS4 survey results are being processed at the time of writing this report, due to 
be published in September 2006. 
 
Practically all relevant R&D data are collected in Hungary, and thus, in principle, those data 
are available. In terms of using available data, there are two major problems in Hungary. 
First, only a limited set of data are published, and thus made available free of charge. This 
limitation has two aspects: level of aggregation (data are published for only a few sectors at a 
NACE 2-digit level; see Appendices 8-10), and the indicators. In other words, if one needs 
more indicators (besides R&D expenditures, personnel or the number of R&D units), or 
figures at a NACE 2 digit level in most industries, or data at NACE 3-digit level, the costs of 
data procession have to be incurred. Obviously, this practice prevents detailed analyses, 
required both for deepening our theoretical understanding of RTDI processes, as well as for 
policy purposes. 
 
Second, the way in which data protection is understood and implemented is also posing a 
challenge from the point of view of theoretical investigations, policy analysis, and ultimately 
policy-making. For instance, the list of R&D performing companies is not available, and thus 
it is not possible to conduct even the most elementary calculations, e.g. to establish how 
many of the top exporters conduct R&D activities in Hungary. It would be a fairly simple and 
cheap exercise, and given the weight of exporting firms in the small, open Hungarian 
economy, a rather pertinent one. It is not possible to analyse the impacts of R&D and 
innovation on micro-economic performance, either, although these three sets of data (R&D, 
innovation, and company performance data) are collected – but using different surveys and 
thus stored in different data sets, which cannot be linked for legal restrictions. In other words, 
public money is spent on collecting data, which cannot be used for analyses aimed at 
supporting public policies. 
 
This issue has been raised by experts at numerous occasions – in various papers and reports, 
e.g. the TrendChart on Innovation country reports, at workshops, etc. – in recent years. The 
Science, Technology Policy and Competitiveness Advisory Board – an expert body advising 
the Science and Technology Policy Committee, headed by the prime minister – has 
commissioned a study on the methods and statistics used in the Hungarian RTDI policy-
                                                 
30
 Minor differences occur in the case of military R&D expenditure, but this is not of major relevance, given the 
relatively low amount spent on military R&D activities. 
  
54 
 
making system, and this report is likely to recommend easing the above limitations. (The 
final version of the report is not publicly available as of yet.) 
 
The conclusions of the sectoral case studies are presented in Sections 3-5. Given the 
importance of sectoral characteristics, only a few overall conclusions can be drawn here. 
First, business R&D expenditures are very low in Hungary: 0.33% of GDP (in 2004), which 
is less than one third of the EU25 average. Second, BERD is highly concentrated in Hungary: 
pharmaceuticals industry accounts for more than on third of the total (34.4% in 2004).Case 
study evidence suggests that BERD is concentrated in terms of size and ownership, too: the 
bulk of BERD is spent by large, foreign-owned companies. (These data at a national or 
sectoral level are not publicly available, either – but can be purchased.) 
 
Our four sectoral case studies confirm the dominant role of foreign-owned firms in RTDI 
activities, too. Foreign-owned firms tend to be large, and thus the decisive share of BERD is 
performed by large enterprises. Using Eurostat data, one can calculate the share of large firms 
(with 250 or more employees) in total R&D expenditures: 96% (2003); and in total R&D 
personnel in manufacturing industry: 78% (2004). 
 
As for the major conclusions of the sectoral case studies, pharmaceuticals industry is the most 
R&D intensive sector in Hungary, in line with the global trends of this sector. The sectoral 
research system has been radically restructured during the past fifteen years as foreign 
pharmaceuticals manufacturers became majority owners in most companies, pursuing global 
R&D strategies. In Hungary, they focus on the development of generic drugs. Thus, the 
number of research projects has decreased, but the allocation of R&D expenditures became 
more efficient. 
 
The most important trends in the world’s medical instruments industry play a determining 
role in the innovation activities of the Hungarian companies. These trends include the 
increasing use of IT systems for the support of medical equipment, the revolution of digital 
imaging equipment and the expansion of the home-use appliances market. Besides research 
and development of the traditional equipment, Hungarian medical equipment manufacturers 
proved successful in the development and application of these product families. 
Automotive industry has been traditionally less R&D intensive, yet, innovation, R&D and 
engineering skills are becoming decisive factors of success for automotive firms, too, given 
the fierce competition, requiring improved products in terms of safety, comfort, and fuel 
efficiency, assisted – and, in the meantime, pressed – by ever faster technological changes. 
Given the excellence of the Hungarian higher education system, there is no shortage of 
engineers endowed with these skills and knowledge. Interviews suggest emerging co-
operation between automotive firms, on the one hand, and university departments as well as 
other R&D units, on the other. More recently, some foreign investors – e.g. Audi, GM Opel, 
ITT, Knorr-Bremse and ZF – have also realised the world-class knowledge of Hungarian 
scientists and engineers, and they are setting up either their in-house R&D units or joint 
research groups with universities. Again, besides professional excellence, there is a 
considerable cost advantage in this field, too. Further, in the second half of the 1990s, R&D 
schemes were also applied to foster innovation activities in the automotive industry, and a 
new one was launched in 2006. 
The successful re-structuring of the Hungarian automotive industry is not only due to some 
‘push’ factors, i.e. the fierce competition among automotive companies and hence the pursuit 
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of cost-cutting via re-location of their production, but it also thanks to ‘pull’ factors, i.e. the 
attractions of the Hungarian economic environment, broadly defined. Given the ever 
changing, and global, nature of the automotive industry, no country can be complacent, on 
the contrary, continuously renewed, concerted efforts and well-devised policy measures are 
needed to achieve further results. 
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7. APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1: Availability of sectoral data on private R&D in Hungary 
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Appendix 2: Reliability of sectoral data sources on private R&D in Hungary 
 
Source No.  1 
Data Source 
Kutatás és fejlesztés/ Research and Development 
(annual bilingual publication) 
Publishing organisation Central Statistical Office 
1. Technical reliability:    
a. Is the method in accordance with 
Commission Regulation No 753/2004 on 
statistics on science and technology? 
Yes 
b. Standard used for R&D survey: Frascati Manual 
c. Explicit differences between national R&D 
surveys and Frascati Manual 
Minor differences in the case of military R&D 
expenditures. 
d. “Implicit” differences between the 
standard national economic or educational 
classifications used in the country’s surveys 
and the international classification 
recommended by the Frascati Manual (2002). 
No 
e. Data source: sample survey, 
administrative data sources or other data 
sources 
Survey including every company that is identified 
as an R&D performer. 
f. Method of data collection: Census/sample 
survey, estimation, combination of both 
Census, annually from 1969 
g. Inclusion of SMEs smaller than 10 
employees? 
Yes 
h. Inclusion of all enterprises performing 
R&D, either continuously or occasionally in 
the R&D survey? 
Yes 
    
2. Theoretical pitfalls:   
a. Caveats for breaks in time series (e.g. 
change in tax incentives, change in data 
collection method, definition of R&D 
employees etc.) 
The CSO has been collecting R&D data since 
1969. During this 40 year period, the data 
collection and publication methods changed 
according to the specifications of the relevant 
guidelines, i. e the Recommendations Concerning 
the International Standardisation of Science and 
Technology by the UNESCO from 1978, the 
Frascati Manual by the OECD from 1996, and its 
most recent EUROSTAT compatible version from 
2002.  
b. Caveats for international comparison (e.g. 
national peculiarities of innovation systems 
and framework conditions) 
No 
c. Others No 
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Source  
No.  
2 
Data Source (2) Innováció 1999-2001 / Innovation 1999-2001 
Publishing organisation  (2a) Central Statistical Office 
1. Technical reliability:    
a. Is the method in accordance with Commission 
Regulation No 753/2004 on statistics on science and 
technology? Yes / No Yes 
b. Standard used for R&D survey: Frascati 
Manual, Canberra Manual or other harmonised 
standards 
The data are CIS3 compatible, based on the Oslo Manual for 
the Measurement of Scientific and Technological Activities. 
c. Explicit differences between national R&D 
surveys and Frascati Manual No 
d. “Implicit” differences between the standard 
national economic or educational classifications used 
in the country’s surveys and the international 
classification recommended by the Frascati Manual 
(2002). No 
e. Data source: sample survey, administrative 
data sources or other data sources Representative sample survey posted to the companies 
f. Method of data collection: Census/sample 
survey, estimation, combination of both (for which 
year) Survey conducted in 2002 for the 1999-2001 period 
g. Inclusion of SMEs smaller than 10 employees? 
Yes/No No 
h. Inclusion of all enterprises performing R&D, 
either continuously or occasionally in the R&D 
survey? Yes/No No 
    
2. Theoretical pitfalls:   
a. Caveats for breaks in time series (e.g. change 
in tax incentives, change in data collection method, 
definition of R&D employees etc.) 
This specific publication is based on a 2002 survey, which was 
CIS3 compatible, run on 6,100 companies, covering all 
sectors of the economy, except for mining and quarrying. 
Besides this activity, there was a pilot innovation survey 
conducted in 2000. That pilot exercise included 1,700 
companies from the manufacturing industry. 
b. Caveats for international comparison (e.g. 
national peculiarities of innovation systems and 
framework conditions) No 
c. Others No 
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Source  
No.  
3 
Data Source (2) Innováció 2003 / Innovation 2003 
Publishing organisation  (2a) Central Statistical Office 
1. Technical reliability:    
a. Is the method in accordance with Commission 
Regulation No 753/2004 on statistics on science and 
technology? Yes / No Yes 
b. Standard used for R&D survey: Frascati 
Manual, Canberra Manual or other harmonised 
standards 
The data are CISLight compatible, based on the Oslo Manual 
for the Measurement of Scientific and Technological Activities. 
c. Explicit differences between national R&D 
surveys and Frascati Manual No 
d. “Implicit” differences between the standard 
national economic or educational classifications used 
in the country’s surveys and the international 
classification recommended by the Frascati Manual 
(2002). No 
e. Data source: sample survey, administrative 
data sources or other data sources Representative sample survey posted to the companies 
f. Method of data collection: Census/sample 
survey, estimation, combination of both (for which 
year) Survey conducted in 2004 (to collect 2003 data) 
g. Inclusion of SMEs smaller than 10 employees? 
Yes/No No 
h. Inclusion of all enterprises performing R&D, 
either continuously or occasionally in the R&D 
survey? Yes/No No 
    
2. Theoretical pitfalls:   
a. Caveats for breaks in time series (e.g. change 
in tax incentives, change in data collection method, 
definition of R&D employees etc.) 
This specific publication is based on a CIS Light survey, 
conducted in 2004, covering all sectors - except for the 
construction industries and retail trade, hotels and 
restaurants, and other community, social and personal service 
activities -, involving 5,094 companies employing more than 
10 employees. 
b. Caveats for international comparison (e.g. 
national peculiarities of innovation systems and 
framework conditions) No 
c. Others No 
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Appendix 3  
 
 
 Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Research and Development 2004 
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Appendix 4  
 
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Research and Development 2004 
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Appendix 5  
 
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Research and Development 2004 
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Appendix 6  
 
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Research and Development 2004 
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Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Research and Development 2004 
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Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Research and Development 2004 
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Appendix 9  
 
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Research and Development 2004 
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Appendix 10 
 
Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office, Research and Development 2004 
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Appendix 11: BERD by sectors, 3-digit level, 2001-2004 (000 HUF) 
NACE code 2001 2002 2003 2004 
011 441494 736369 687898 460714 
014 80818 51094 76697 48409 
020 62714 68546 : 36108 
050 : 87027 75965 31002 
151 70961 131522 147180 85530 
153 34471 65947 77325 31316 
156 14807 45381 81000 110106 
157 47272 30112 36902 : 
158 29579 149139 171366 86926 
159 : 59606 42158 104877 
241 871968 814307 777780 776697 
243 176636 : 823111 146173 
244 14947762 17286023 17839945 25655644 
245 163783 53182 35081 177539 
246 78946 56282 51815 24036 
251 228140 : 239576 165473 
252 363000 130608 260401 254636 
281 46456 60425 41658 14645 
282 13947 : 69730 : 
291 103037 45099 82617 72435 
292 241695 303907 510713 747075 
293 221227 199877 275723 217537 
294 : 231967 203949 1088945 
295 90400 123173 137208 95551 
297 934461 871512 776115 1115881 
300 198398 260328 : : 
312 350156 282606 241340 352491 
315 3200627 2488065 2889785 3001107 
316 567978 416243 1645404 3543586 
321 274978 501372 65262 308799 
322 4709523 5301557 5339582 4888519 
323 : 25189 390911 544702 
331 272814 490866 550169 228983 
332 336977 356006 489349 497143 
333 140000 169311 179418 381389 
341 3076905 944181 1272561 3379996 
343 1573872 1722505 4253237 2301585 
361 : 39667 21787 13005 
402 29921 : 36240 : 
410 76498 167997 150407 158574 
452 69989 112926 143117 163408 
511 58198 62461 103623 37956 
514 211155 146937 169780 : 
515 : 190782 63182 36181 
516 188021 366310 : : 
517 4213932 5943675 : : 
518 : : 327457 270100 
519 : : 6182165 6446917 
642 1635391 414552 414562 283396 
722 1122109 426727 516003 960918 
726 122588 184041 142551 42790 
731 9886286 10385255 8568453 7073346 
732 340236 764918 370878 478122 
741 159798 225232 268758 296490 
742 434648 403663 1131945 308639 
743 164356 457212 540925 657217 
748 14378 10935 : 44775 
851 : 41391 86760 338005 
900 195860 148090 170983 58087 
913 11702 34407 : 56364 
Source: CSO, data provide exclusively for this project, free of charge 
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Appendix 12 
 
Source: Innováció 2003/ Innovation 2003, CSO 
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Appendix 13 
 
 
Source: Innováció 2003/ Innovation 2003, CSO 
 
